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1  Introduction 
 
A decision of the Dutch Minister for Development Co-operation (September 2008) to make subsidies 
available for research on fragile states led to the establishment of the Knowledge Network for Peace, 
Security and Development (KNPSD). The network aims to make tangible contributions to policy 
development, through knowledge mobilization around societal processes related to fragility and 
development. In this context, knowledge does not refer specifically and exclusively to academic 
knowledge. Rather, it also includes knowledge available among policy makers, practitioners and 
'daily knowledge' among beneficiary populations and society-level actors. Combining academic with 
practitioner analyses and the related multi-partners approach to research is relatively unique. Five 
Working Groups have been formed as part of this Network, one among them focusing on Multi 
Stakeholder Processes, Service Delivery and State Institutions. This report presents the case studies 
performed in Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) for this Working Group.    
 
As mentioned, the focus on the research lies on „fragile contexts‟ which are characterized by conflict 
or political instability. However, it is important to acknowledge that this discourse, and these 
„indicators‟ bear in themselves a negative connotation since they are often related to other „negative‟ 
factors in a country‟s context (e.g. corruption, weak administrative systems, conflict, absence of 
capacities). For a critical discussion of the „fragile states‟ discourse, please see the Working Group‟s 
Theoretical Framework, available through www.psdnetwork.nl and stel@msm.nl. 
 
The Working Group‟s project is responding to the need for more evidence on how cooperation 
between public and civil society actors and institutional legitimacy can improve service delivery and 
thereby contribute to the legitimacy and effectiveness of state institutions. Several groups therefore 
may be able to use the outcomes/products of the research. First, it assists international NGOs and 
policy makers in (re)defining their intervention and secondly supports strategies and policies in a 
conflict and post-conflict setting. Furthermore, local policy makers and local NGOs should draw 
lessons on how MSP engagement can be put to use most effectively for service delivery.  
  
The main question that guides this project is: “How do multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) for the 
improvement of service delivery affect the performance and governance of those services, and how 
does this affect the legitimacy of state institutions?”  
 
As indicated in the Working Group‟s Theoretical Framework: “This question aims to shed light on a 
concern that has recently been expressed by donors, governments and in development literature, that 
support to out-of-state service providers (NGOs in particular) may result in improved services on the 
short term, but will on the long term undermine the government‟s legitimacy. The heightened interest 
in MSPs could even be understood as a desire to resolve this problem“ (Hilhorst in Noor et al, 2010, 
p.8). Literature indicates that public-private partnerships and civil society participation is assumed to 
increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state in service delivery while – on the other hand, or 
in other cases – it is perceived to be undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state (Bakker, 
2008; Beisheim and Dingwerth, 2008; Dellas 2011; Swyngedouw 2005). Although this seems 
contradictory, these differences can be explained in several ways. First of all, much of the literature 
and reports are based on particular ideological underpinnings and developmental approaches, 
whether this is the „good governance‟ donor debate, the New Public Management approach, or neo-
liberal approaches towards service delivery. Secondly, the terminology and conceptualization of 
legitimacy show considerable variation and operationalization of „legitimacy‟ is challenging (see the 
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theoretical framework). Furthermore, in those contexts that are labeled as „developmental‟, „fragile‟, 
„conflict‟ or „post-conflict‟, stakeholders are not as neatly separated as one may analytically find 
convenient. Networks are extremely important when the state is not able to fulfill all its 
responsibilities, and people may be simultaneously be part of interest groups, advocacy groups; ad 
hoc emerging movements (one-issue movements), political parties, public sector, and have shares in 
the private sector. Even „the‟ state can be confusing, when authorities that are not internationally 
recognized do have de-facto power and legitimacy are able to facilitate service delivery to some 
extent.  
 
This report will document the findings for the four selected Palestinian cases. The case of Palestine is 
particularly interesting because (a) its status as an independent „State‟ is still contested (more by 
some, less by others); (b) the performance, governance, and thereby legitimacy of the Palestinian 
Authorities is not only determined by internal (f)actors, but also shaped, framed and conditioned by 
Israel and by the actions and sanctions from international actors; and (c) because of contested (and 
double) authority-structures in Gaza Strip.   
 
The report consists of four parts. The first part gives an overview of research objectives, core concepts, 
research approach, and case study selection. Key notions on theory and methodology can be found in 
the Working Group‟s „Theoretical framework & Methodologies Working Paper‟, of March 2010 
(Noor, Douma, Van der Haar, Hilhorst, Van der Molen, Stel, 2010). 
 
The second part provides the context of the case studies in terms of the sectors of service delivery in 
Palestine: water for irrigation; water supply for domestic use, waste water treatment, and solid waste 
management. The third part describes the selected MSPs. The fourth part consist of an analysis of the 
findings in relation to legitimacy and the fifth part provides conclusions on the main research 
question and its sub-questions. 
 
1.1 Core concepts 
 
The first concept that warrants explicit attention is the concept of Multi-Stakeholder Processes (MSPs). 
In this research, it refers to processes of cooperation between multiple actors, from various societal 
domains (public sector, private sector, civil society, communities) in networks, platforms, and 
partnerships (Warner, 2006). The focus lies on those networks, platforms and partnerships that are 
formed in the context of a planned project, as well as processes that grow from partly planned and 
partly spontaneous, informal arrangements. It is important to note that “the very fact that they can be 
considered MSPs may be unnoticed by the participants.“ (Hilhorst, in Noor et al. 2010, p. 8). An in-
depth discussion of MSPs is provided by Mina Noor in the Working Group‟s Theoretical Framework 
(Noor et al, 2010, Ch. 4). Since this research looks at those processes in which state institutions are 
participating as stakeholder, it is furthermore important to briefly reflect on „the state‟. 
 
The state has been conceptualized in a multitude of definitions. The state has been defined in 
Weberian terms, with notions such as the monopoly and legitimacy of the use of force, of a defined 
territory, a government, the capacity to enter into relations with other states, a permanent population, 
independence, and/or the ability to function as states. The state has also been defined in legal terms, 
as “an entity having exclusive jurisdiction with regard to its territory and personal jurisdiction over 
its nationals” (Akinrinade, 2009:14) and in institutional terms with a focus on the administrative 
capacity of governance. Many of these definitions are problematic (see Van der Molen and Stel, in 
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Noor, et al, 2010), in particular in Palestinian Territories, where almost none of the above mentioned 
conditions apply.  
 
We agree with Lund, who argues that, “while government institutions are important, the state 
qualities of governance /…/ are not exclusively nested in these institutions” (Lund, 2007:13). The 
multifaceted nature of governance is thus further complicated by the growing importance of 
institutions and movements which perform tasks otherwise attributed to the state, and their activities 
can contribute to the further weakening of state structures. Alternative centers of governance (e.g. 
Hamas authorities in the Gaza strip) take over some of these tasks, even when it is labeled as a 
terrorist organization by the international community. Here we also touch upon the discussion 
regarding legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Palestinian state and its offices is difficult to identify as 
long as the geopolitical status (one- or two-state solution or other variations) is still not clarified.  
 
The question, in other words, becomes whether legitimacy is functionally defined (and linked to 
whatever actor or combination of actors provides this function) or institutionally. Legitimacy is 
defined as “the normative belief of a political community that a rule or institution should be obeyed“ 
(Papagianni, in Call and Wyeth, 2008, p. 50). In the context of this research, we follow the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in distinguishing five forms of 
legitimacy (OECD, 2008:17): 
• general legitimacy (related to support for the state as a whole, for the idea of the state) 
• embedded legitimacy (related to prior state formation or other historical dynamics) 
• process legitimacy (related to the way the organisation operates, its governance procedures) 
• performance legitimacy (related to what the organisation produces/yields) 
• international legitimacy (related to international standards and contexts) 
 
This overview includes both functionally and institutionally defined manifestations of legitimacy.  
 
Indicators 
General legitimacy, based on political and ideological considerations and preferences, and embedded 
legitimacy, based on historically developed conventions, have shown such overlap in the context of 
Palestine, that we decided to discuss them as one category for the Palestinian case studies. This 
category can be assessed using the following indicators: (a) the knowledge of the existence and 
activities of relevant state institutions; (b) the willingness to participate in activities organized by 
them; (c) the willingness to pay for services provided by them; and (d) the extent to which such state 
institutions are seen as operating accountable and representative. These issues to a large extent 
determine the expectations on the basis of which the performance and process of the institutions 
within the MSP are appreciated. Process legitimacy can be measured by looking at (a) perceived 
cooperation with non-state actors; (b) perceived efforts to reduce problems identified within the MSP; 
(c) process related expectations for the state in the realm of service delivery are met; (d) perceived 
changes in governance procedures in response to the MSP; (e) protection of beneficiaries‟ rights; and 
(f) perceived cooperation among state actors. The international legitimacy of state institutions can be 
understood as (a) the recognition and legitimacy of state institutions among international actors; and 
(b) as the legitimacy of international actors, their interventions and their role in the MSP among MSP 
members. 
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1.2 Research question(s) and methodology 
The main research question for this study is: How do multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) for the 
improvement of service delivery affect the performance and governance of those services, and how 
does this affect the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions?  
 
Key sub-questions constituting this main question are: 
 Which actors and trends can be identified in service delivery in the studied context? 
 What are the characteristics of the multi-stakeholder process organized for service delivery? 
 How is this process governed? 
 What are the outputs in terms of service delivery? 
 How does participation in the MSP affect the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions? 
 What are key factors in the (socio-political & institutional) context influencing MSPs, service 
delivery, and their relation with the legitimacy of state institutions?  
The methodology is based on qualitative research, using a case study approach. The data collection is 
based on structured interviews and focus group discussions, secondary information, and a series of 
meetings. 
 
1.2.1 Case study selection 
In the Palestinian Territories, the cases were selected on the basis of the general criteria from the 
Working Group and suggestions during the kick-off meeting in December 2009. Based on discussions 
within the Working Group, we chose for complementarity instead of comparability. The criteria were:  
 The MSP is organized around utilities or basic services such as water, electricity and 
infrastructure; 
 The MSP preferably involves three types of actors, private, public and civil, with at least one 
public sector representative and at least one civil society representative;  
 The MSP should be operating, with measurable output, in order to analyze whether the MSP 
has contributed to these outcomes;  
 The MSP must be functioning for at least two years, at the time of the research, in order to 
ensure that there are outputs to examine. 
 
In addition to this, and based on the discussion during the kick off meeting, the final selection criteria 
have been:  
 geographic spread (North West Bank, South West Bank, and Gaza Strip),  
 complementarity in terms of utility sector (waste, water for irrigation, domestic water, 
treatment of waste water);  
 a mix of initiatives that had a strong donor-involvement and initiatives which were initiated 
by local actors and sought for funding afterwards; 
 including initiatives which were of strategic importance or unique.  
 
The geographic coverage (north, south, Gaza) brought out interesting additional information. 
Governance processes in southern part of the West Bank are said to be more influenced by personal 
relations, personal legitimacy, and social networks which have some features of a clan- or tribal 
system. One of the results of this is, that in the south, village counselors, municipalities and mayors 
find it much more difficult to enforce regulations and payment of fees (e.g. for the use of water), even 
among „relatively rich‟ inhabitants. In the north of the West Bank, governance is more based on 
formal regulations and procedures, where government authorities think of rational or „smart‟ 
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solutions to enforce regulations. For Gaza, the governance process is characterized by a „governance 
divide‟ along political fault lines (Hamas/Fatah). 
 
The first case study is the rehabilitation of irrigation groundwater wells in two cities: Qalqilyia and 
Tulkarm. Both cities are located in north-western part of the West Bank close to the Green line. This 
report focuses on a project to rehabilitate the irrigation groundwater wells in these two areas, 
especially the one behind the separation wall (located in area C). This case study is of particular 
interest because the project activities serve not only a practical interest (irrigation of land) but also a 
more strategic interest (preventing the land between the green line and the wall to become property 
of the state of Israel). The dynamics of interaction and interference from the multiple stakeholders is 
therefore expected to be different from initiatives with „only‟ a practical interest. 
 
The second case study is Zahret Al-finjan landfill; the project is located in Zahrat Al Finjan region 
approximately 17 km southwest of Jenin city. The area of the project covers about 240,000 square 
meter). The capacity of the landfill was estimated to be 2.25 million tons (total in 15 years), which 
serve the northern governorates for 15 years as a first phase. After the landfill construction was 
completed in June 2007, other municipalities from Nablus and Tulkarm governorates were accepted 
to deliver their wastes to the landfill, which increased the beneficiaries to about 800,000 of inhabitants. 
This initiative is strongly supported by donor organizations. It is particular in three ways: (a) almost 
immediately after the start of the implementation, the 2nd Intifada started; (b) the Civilian 
Administration from Israel granted approval to construct this facility; while many other proposals 
were rejected or delayed; and (c) as a result, it is one of the few regulated and formal landfill in 
Palestine until now. 
 
The third case study is a Waste Water Treatment Plant (WWTP); located in Southern part of West 
Bank in Kharas village; approximately 8 kilometers west of Hebron City.  The waste water treatment 
plant project was a reply to the local community seeking an alternative for sewage disposal into 
cesspits. The wastewater was the main sources of polluting the groundwater as well as drinking 
water in that area.  
 
The fourth case study is a desalination station in Gaza Strip. This station is located in Bureij area in 
the central part of Gaza Strip, and was established after an assessment in 2006 of the situation for the 
water service showed how much citizens in Bureij area suffered from high salinity of their drinking 
water. This case reveals the difficulties of governing a multi-stakeholder process in a complex 
situation as in Gaza, which is not only constrained by repeated episodes of armed violence and 
military operations, by withdrawal of donor organizations after the elections were won by Hamas, 
but also facing a double public administration (one run by Hamas, the other one non-active under the 
Palestinian Authority). 
 
1.2.2 Data collection for the Palestinian cases 
In all cases (except Gaza), a number of interviews were conducted, based on the interview protocol as 
designed by the Working Group. As a part of this task, we interviewed citizens, experts, 
governmental representatives, donors, and others. For each case study, we interviewed a minimum of 
six citizens, 3 experts (2 of them were involved with the projects and one was not involved in these 
projects), as well as 2 persons from each governmental institute involved with these projects, and 2 
persons from the donor organizations. In general, more citizens were interviewed, either through 
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structured interviews (SI) or through focus group discussions (FG)
1
. In combination with the analysis 
of findings from a number of case studies we expect to gain more insight in the potential successful 
MSP in the coming years. 
 
All interviews were executed by staff from the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), through their 
offices in Jenin, Hebron, Ramallah and Gaza. The exploration workshop and kick-off meetings (both 
2009), the mid-term review (2010) and validation workshop (January 2011), were all attended by both 
authors, while the exploration and kick-off meeting, and mid-term review, were also attended by 
Nora Stel. The coordinating researcher of PHG was Dr. Wafa Hasan, who was familiar with all the 
cases except the one in Gaza. Secondary data was collected through project documentation, statistical 
information, articles in scientific journals, books from scientific publishers, and reports by donors, 
NGOs and others.  
 
Three comments need to be made with regard to the methodology and case study selection.  
 One of the methodological difficulties is that all projects had some involvement by the local 
partner organization, the PHG, itself. The subsequent risk of subjectivity is therefore present 
in all four cases, although failures and constraints have – in general - been openly discussed 
at the interim meeting and the validation workshop, where stakeholders were present. It is in 
particular in Kharas village (waste water treatment plant) that interviews seemed much more 
positive than the actual situation allowed. A visit by researchers (Irna van der Molen, Nora 
Stel and Wafa Hasan) to the Waste Water Treatment Plant, and discussion with the Mayor 
revealed some of the constraints they were facing.  
 The case in Gaza, one of the most interesting given the complex political reality on the 
ground, showed remarkable little progress, due to the difficult political situation and the 
difficult research context. Furthermore, the frequent power failures (of electricity) and failing 
internet connections seriously hampered information gathering. Videoconferencing with 
Gaza failed during all three meetings due to lack of electricity in Gaza. During the last 
meeting (January 2011), contact was established through SKYPE (with webcam and a laptop 
speaker). Although a general impression evolved on the difficult operational situation in 
Gaza, the researchers concluded that the case report on Gaza will be much more concise due 
to (a) difficulties to access stakeholders and beneficiaries and (b) lack of willingness of 
stakeholders to openly discuss (through SKYPE and phone) the complexity of the situation in 
the politically sensitive reality they find themselves in. Many people who used to work for 
the Palestinian Authorities before 2007 have left. Those still there are continued to be paid, 
however under the condition of not coming to the office and not accessing the data on their 
computers (both being taken over by the new administration under Hamas). Many donors 
stopped funding projects in Gaza, so interviewing these people was almost impossible. 
Unfortunately, travel conditions, required permits, and the current safety situation do not 
allow members of the research team (whether foreigners of staff from PHG West Bank) to 
travel to Gaza to gather further information „on the ground‟2.  
 Another methodological constraint is that, at the three workshops organized, only a select 
group of stakeholders was present. At the meetings two groups have been absent: (a) 
beneficiaries/farmers/citizens; and (b) donors - sometimes despite confirmation by telephone 
                                                          
1 E.g. in Kharas village, 12 citizens were interviewed and 10 others attended a focus group discussion. 
In Qalqiliya and Tulkarm, 16 citizens were interviewed and another 12 attended a focus group 
discussion.  
2 Add on top of that, the citizen themselves might be biased to the new government or to the old one. 
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of attendance the day before the meeting. Both groups were specifically and repeatedly 
invited. The formal invitation was followed up by multiple telephone calls for each invitee, 
and requests for confirmation by the coordinating researcher. The context in which travel 
times are doubled or sometimes tripled, due to checkpoints and bypass roads (only a select 
number of roads is available for Palestinians), is likely to explain the absence of beneficiaries. 
In addition to the travel time, most beneficiaries are involved in a range of other activities 
which have higher priority than a meeting without direct benefit. 
 
1.2.3 Meetings 
The methodology as presented in the Theoretical Framework and the Research Protocol developed by 
the Working Group was discussed and adjusted in line with recommendations made by stakeholders 
or the advisory committee during several meetings. The Palestinian cases served also as pilot cases in 
which the methodology was tested for the other countries. Two meetings were held to introduce the 
project to, respectively, the Nablus and the Hebron and Gaza offices of the PHG. These meetings 
simultaneously provided the feedback and input of the experts affiliated with these offices. Also, an 
additional series of three meetings with the PHG Nablus experts has taken place to seek their advice 
on the operationalization of the interview questions towards the Palestinian context. Finally, before 
the kick off meeting, the PHG hosted an External Experts Consultation Session in which the research 
project was presented to experts representing both public and private organizations. These specialists 
were briefed on the objectives of the research. With these different meetings the CCS and the PHG 
benefitted from the knowledge and experience of people working in and with the sectors subject of 
the research project and sought to explore how these people can benefit from the research. 
 
The meetings themselves also provided additional information/data that could be used in the case 
studies. The communication and interaction with other (non-PHG) local experts has resulted in a 
broader frame of reference for the research that, on the one hand, ensures that the research is 
scrutinized and evaluated by a sufficiently varied set of people and, on the other hand, could help 
translate the outcomes and finding of the research in a way that would benefit other sectors and 
country studies as well. Four of these meetings are summarized below: the preparatory consultative 
expert meeting; the kick-off meeting; the mid-term meeting and the validation workshop.  
Consultative expert meeting. 
Feeling that some outside expertise might bring new perspectives on the interview protocols in 
progress, an external expert consultative session was organized during which experts could give their 
feedback on the draft interview protocols. Based on the outcomes of this meeting a semi-final version 
of the two interview protocols for the two Nablus-managed case-studies was developed. The above 
described procedure was opted for based on three main considerations. First, to acknowledge the 
advice and expertise of the partner organisation as thoroughly as possible. Assuming that the local 
experts would have more and better information on and insights in the issues relevant for the country 
study, the feedback and requests (for example concerning adjusting the interview questions per target 
group and per case-study) that the PHG experts offered in almost weekly meetings have been 
structurally adhered to. Second, to also involve local experts and stakeholders beyond our specific 
partner organisation – which we did by means of the external experts consultation session and the 
kick-off meeting (see p. 12). Third, to continue to relate the activities and developments in the 
Palestinian country study to the progress and perceptions of the consortium and the stipulations of 
the broader research project. 
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The consultative expert meeting was the first in a series of meetings and was attended by 11 experts, 
from the Palestinian Water Authorities, from the Ministry of Agriculture, Palestinian Agricultural 
Relief Committee (PARC), Birzeit University, Ministry of Planning and International cooperation, the 
German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and the Palestine Economic Policy 
Research Institute - MAS. This meeting provided ample opportunity for interaction between 
participants, PHG and the research team. The expert consultative meeting served as platform for 
discussion of (a) questions related to the research itself; (b) the process of, and criteria for, case-study 
selection; (c) the nature of MSPs as processes instead of partnerships; and (d) the draft interview 
protocols. It also positively affected the future dynamics of the project. It provided the first 
opportunity to take away feelings of anxiety of organizations about „being evaluated‟, something that 
returned during the kick-off meeting, but was not perceived to be a threat anymore at later stages. 
The main achievement of this approach, however, was the full-fledged involvement of the partner 
organisation in the (re)development of the interview questions that has yielded interview protocols of 
a richness in detail and depth that could not have been attained had we limited ourselves to the 
general questions developed by the Dutch Working Group. In this context, the pilot function of the 
Palestinian country study – the fact that the case-studies in other countries would benefit from the 
work done and the insights gained in the Palestinian Territory – was expressed to be a great 
motivator for the Palestinian experts. 
Kick off meeting 
The kick-off meeting took place at 16 December 2009, and was attended by 17 participants from a 
variety of organisations, including the Palestinian Water Authorities, Palestinian Hydrology Group 
(Ramallah office, Nablus office, Hebron office, and Gaza office through telephone), an academic 
observer, the Water Environment Development Organization, the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and a consultant to the Palestinian Water 
Authority.  
 
The kick-off meeting took place after a series of other meetings that had taken place to further 
introduce and discuss interview protocols, the case-study selection and the context analysis. The 
envisioned purposes of the kick-off meeting were threefold. First, to introduce the general research 
project to the relevant stakeholders, partners and experts – to explain the goals of and the background 
to the research and present the case-studies so far selected. In doing so, we aimed to set a precedent of 
transparency and visibility for further stages of the research project. Second, the meeting was 
organized to explore suggestions towards the research project as a whole and the approach of the 
research in the Palestinian Territory. Third, we hoped to assess the experiences with and the 
perspectives on MSPs that relevant organizations and individuals in the Palestinian Territory hold. 
And, in fact, this approach has provided us with significant new input in terms of both content and 
methodology; has ensured more visibility and transparency for the research project (or at least the 
Palestinian country study of the research project); has created room to assess how the research can be 
made more relevant and useful for the partner organisation and the general utility service sector in 
the country and to encounter a more national perspective on MSPs; and, finally, the kick-off meeting 
resulted in an advisory committee as described in the introduction to this report. A more detailed 
report on the lessons learned from the kick off meeting can be read in the „Lessons Learned‟ report 
(Stel, 2009) and the Report of the Kick-off meeting for the Palestinian component of the „MSPs, service 
delivery and state institutions‟ research project (Stel, 2009). 
Mid-term meeting 
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The mid-term meeting with the Advisory Team, with participants from the Palestinian Water 
Authority, the Environmental Quality Authority, the Ministry of Agriculture, PHG, and the research 
team, took place during the first week of May 2010, to present the first findings, to identify 
information gaps, and make recommendations for follow-up. At the start, the research team 
emphasized that the research on MSPs did not intend to evaluate the individual projects, a concern 
that some stakeholders expressed. At that time, two cases were almost completed (irrigation well 
rehabilitation in Qalqilyia and Tulkarm; and the landfill in Zahrat Al Finjan area), and a third case 
study was underway (Kharas Waste Water Treatment Plant). The Advisory Committee recommended 
that this research (MSPs, Service Delivery and State Institutions) was interesting, but (too) limited in 
scope. Therefore, one of the recommendations was to look for ways to expand the scope of the project 
to include many more projects as a learning exercise for stakeholders at NGOs, Ministries and the 
Authorities and as a way to gradually improve the governance of MSPs.  
 
The mid-term meeting aimed to: (a) inform advisory committee and ourselves on preliminary 
outcomes; (b) ensure continuing commitment; and (c) determine gaps in preliminary outputs/gaps. 
All of these have been met. For the latter, the gaps identified were: the role of legitimacy in service 
delivery was not sufficiently clear: Most of the interview questions do not relate to, or give any 
insights in, the legitimacy of the state institutions. This lesson has been taken back to the consortium 
to ensure adjustment of the interview protocols for those case studies not yet conducted. Another 
comment was that – in order to determine whether involvement in MSPs affects the legitimacy of 
state institutions - we should also research non-MSP projects. From a methodological perspective, this 
is a valuable observation. Since the Palestinian cases were already selected, this has been taken into 
consideration for future projects, but could not be incorporated in the methodology for the Palestinian 
cases anymore. 
Validation workshop 
The validation workshop, organized and facilitated by PHG in Ramallah on 12 January 2011, served 
several purposes: validation of findings; additional information gathering from stakeholders present 
if necessary; discussion in parallel groups on the lessons learned from each case; live contact with the 
researcher in Gaza, and discussion on follow-up. 
 
The workshop was well attended, with the exception of citizens/beneficiaries and donors. The overall 
response from the stakeholders attending the workshop was very positive; the discussion 
constructive, and stakeholders were inviting us and each other to think of ways to continue such 
discussions in the near future on a more structural basis. One of the main findings of the validation 
workshop was that donors focus too much on governance (of MSPs) and cooperation during the 
project, but not sufficient on governance (of MSPs), monitoring and follow-up upon completion.  
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2 Case study context 
 
2.1 General 
History 
The present conflict over water resources in Israel and the Palestinian Territories has its roots in the 
Partition Plan of 1947, the unilateral declaration of the establishment of Israel in 1948, the 1967 war, 
the Oslo agreements, and other developments. Israel took control over the water resources in the 
West Bank after the 1967 war. This was arranged through a number of Military Orders, most 
prominently MO 92, that transferred authority over water resources to the region‟s military 
commander; MO 158, that prohibited unlicensed construction of water infrastructure; and MO 291, 
according to which the Military commander assumed jurisdiction over water
3
. These events are still 
relevant at present, and the institutional mechanisms established by the Oslo Agreements still play an 
important (often restrictive) role in addressing the water shortages experienced by Palestinians in the 
Palestinian Territories. The Joint Water Committee was established as a result of the Interim  
Agreements (Oslo II) in 1995. The JWC needs to approve new water and sewerage projects in the 
West Bank. Decisions are taken on the basis of consensus. Although Israel and Palestine are equally 
represented in this Committee, it is widely perceived by stakeholders to reiterate existing power 
imbalances between Israel and Palestine, postponing and delaying projects, which could have been 
used to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Palestinian Authorities in providing water and 
waste water services4. 
  
Due to an asymmetry of power, capacity, information and interests in the Joint Water Committee, and 
a range of internal (technical, financial, political and technical) problems, the Palestinian Authorities 
have not been as effective in improving the water, waste water and solid waste infrastructure as 
citizens have been hoping for, resulting in a lowering of citizens perception of the way in which 
water, waste water and solid waste is governed (process) and the performance in the effective 
delivery of services.  
 
2.2 The „State‟ in the Palestinian Context  
 
In the Palestinian context, „the‟ State is a problematic concept, at least in the Weberian sense. While 
UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947 (the Partition Plan) discusses the necessary 
arrangements for two States including membership of the UN
5
, Israel unilaterally declared its 
independence in 1948, and the State of Palestine is – at present - not a state in political terms: the 
                                                          
3  MO 92, august 15, 1967; MO 158, November 19, 1967; and MO 291, December 1968 (WB, 2009, p. 5). 
4 For a further discussion and overview of JWC‟s project approval/delay/rejection rate, see: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/Annex12,Aug31,2009(enriched).pdf; 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WaterRestrictionsReport18Apr2009.pdf 
, and http://go.worldbank.org/71X59QSH80 accessed 1 December 2011. 
5 UN GA resolution 181 (II), Resolution Adopted on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian 
Question. Part I: Future Constitution and Government of Palestine, F. Admission to Membership in the United 
Nations.  
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boundaries are not recognized or respected by Israel, and there is not one single Authority
6
. Another 
feature commonly associated with „the state‟ is that authorities have a monopoly on the use of arms, 
and control over their territories. While the Palestinian Authorities do not have a monopoly on the 
use of arms, they also lack control over their territories: more than 60% of the West Bank is effectively 
under Israeli control.  
 
The „Palestinian Territories‟ consist of Gaza Strip and the West Bank with A, B, C, H1, H2 and the 
Eastern Segregation Zone. These areas are the result of the Oslo Agreements and the areas were 
further demarcated by the Wye memorandum and the The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum
7
. Area A 
is under Palestinian control (17% of the land of the West Bank); in Area B: civil affairs are under 
Palestinian control; security is under joint Palestinian-Israeli control (24% of the land); Area C is 
under Israeli civil and military control (59% in 2009, estimated 64% in 2011). Area C includes all 
settlements
8
, land surrounding these settlements, military installations, security zones, and roads for 
Israelis in the West Bank. H1 is the part of Hebron under Palestinian control, H2 the part of Hebron 
under Israeli control
9
.  
 
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority over its citizens is not present in all case study 
areas and is most notably absent in large parts (area C) of the Palestinian Territories. Two of the MSP 
projects that were studied as part of this research, were particularly affected by the limited Palestinian 
jurisdiction and control over resources: the MSP that established the Zahrat AL-Funjan landfill in 
Jenin; and the Qalqiliya and Tulkarm irrigation well rehabilitation project. In both cases, permits were 
required from the Joint Water Committee and the civilian Administration, either for the choice of the 
location (Zahrat-al Funjan landfill); for the design (landfill) or for importing equipment (landfill and 
wells) and building new infrastructure (landfill). A third project, the Kharas Waste Water Treatment 
Plant, faced problems in convincing farmers to use treated waste water for a variety of reasons (see 
case studies), including the marketability of the crops that were irrigated with treated waste water; 
taking into account that the products from the settlements are already perceived as more attractive 
and arrive earlier on the markets (also Palestinian markets).   
 
The Palestinian National Authority is further dependent, on part of its income, from the Israeli 
government for (return of) tax revenues, through the customs agreement. The Israeli State has, on a 
number of occasions decided to withhold or delay the transfer of tax revenues belonging to the 
Palestinian National Authority, most recently on May 1, 2011, after the agreement between Hamas 
and Fatah to form a unity government and after acceptance of Palestinian membership of UNESCO.  
 
Therefore, reference to the „State‟ can at best be replaced by „state authorities‟. For the waste and 
water sector in the West Bank, the most relevant state authorities are:  
1. Political decisions: The Palestinian (National) Authority (West Bank) or Hamas (Gaza) 
2. Policy, planning, development and regulation: Ministries and departments, in particular: 
Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), Ministry of Environmental Affairs (MEnA); 
Environmental Quality Authority (EQA) / Palestinian Environmental Authority (PEnA), 
                                                          
6
 The research was conducted before the formation of a united government between Hamas and the PA. The 
„unity government‟ (May/June 2011) is therefore not included in the description and analysis.  
7
 The full name of this Memorandum is: The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of 
Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations 
8
 144 settlements in 2009, with a total settler population of 517,774 (PCBS, 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1749.pdf accessed 12 July 2011. 
9
 Other figures indicate that area C is now 62% (http://www.ochaopt.org)    
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Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC), Ministry of Health (MoH), and Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
3. Distribution of water: Local authorities, in particular local councils and municipalities, Joint 
Service Councils10; and those utilities that are linked to municipalities, such as the Coastal 
Municipal Water Utility (CMWU) in Gaza.  
 
2.3 Socio-economic situation 
 
The occupation, mobility restrictions, and the general socio-economic situation, played the major role 
in the destabilization of the area, especially after the Second Intifada in 2000. Following a series of 
suicide bombing during the 2nd intifada (2000-2005), Israel constructed the wall, or „separation barrier‟ 
to ensure security. The wall and other barriers, while being a security measure for Israelis, result in a 
system of „closure‟ for Palestinians, that affects, amongst others (a) access to land; (b) access to 
equipment and infrastructure; (c) access to safe and economic water resources; (d) access to markets; 
and (e) access to employment opportunities.  
 
The Second Intifada had a major impact on Palestine‟s economy. Not only because economic life in 
the West Bank itself was interrupted, but also because the Palestinians that worked in Israel or Israeli 
Settlements lost their jobs. In 2011, 11 years after the beginning of the Intifada, only a small 
percentage of Palestinians have permits again to work in Israel or Israeli settlements. Following the 
second Intifada, Israel stepped up security measures, including construction of the Wall and 
separation of roads for Israelis and Palestinians.  Part of the wall is inside (east of) the Green Line, 
thereby separating Palestinian lands from their owners. Accordingly, many Palestinians that had land 
near the wall or bypass roads, lost some or all of their land. The wall has had an impact on the 
Palestinian agricultural sector by uprooting of trees, isolating agricultural land (and the greenhouses 
on those lands); and isolating wells. Qalqiliya has been affected in particular: it has lost 19 
groundwater wells (PHG and WaSH Monitoring Program, 2007-2008, p.37). 
 
According to the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics, between 1999 and 2003, the real per capita 
income and consumption dropped with approximately one third, while the unemployment rates 
increased from 10% before the intifada, to 26% in 2003 (PCBS and World Bank, 2004, p. 9). In 2010, the 
unemployment rate of the labor force (15 years and over) was still 23.7%, of which 17.2% in the West 
Bank, and 37.8% in Gaza. The PCBS (2011) indicates that “informal sector projects contribute about 
11% of the Palestinian Gross Domestic Product” (PCBS, 2011, p.20). This means that employment in 
the informal sector cannot be ignored; this accounted (in 2008) for almost 20% (formal and informal 
employment
11
 in the informal sector
12
. The Gross national income for Palestinians has increased from 
US$ 1,230 in 2005, to US$ 1,508.50 in 2009, and was estimated between 1,383.20 (pessimistic scenario) 
1,524.40 (baseline scenario) or 1,595.10 (optimistic scenario) for 2010. (PCBS, 2011)
13
.  
 
                                                          
10 For example, the Jenin Joint Service Council, established in 2000, initially consists of 15 municipalities and 5 
village councils, but by December 2009, this increased to 56 communities‟ (WB, Implementation Completion and 
Results Report‟ TF 24696, 2009, p. 15, p. 21) 
11 For definition of informal employment see (PCBS, 2011, p. 24). Informal employment includes both paid 
(wage) labor, and unpaid labor, such as family labor and self-employed labor. 
12 The PCBS defined the informal sector in Palestine as all Unincorporated Enterprises owned by Households 
that produce at least one unit for the Market without registration in the tax registration. 
13 http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Forecasts_E_2010.pdf accessed 12 july 2011 
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The following sections offer a description of the water sector, the social, economic, and 
institutional/legal context in which the MSPs operate. 
 
2.4 Water resources  
 
Israel and the Palestinian Territories are riparians to some of the region‟s most important fresh water 
resources: the Coastal Aquifer
14
 (250 MCM), the Mountain Aquifer (320 MCM), and the Jordan River 
Basin
15
. With the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, Palestine has lost access to the Jordan river.  
 
West Bank 
The West Bank has three main groundwater drainage basins: 1) Western aquifer system, 2) 
Northeastern aquifer system, and 3) Eastern aquifer system. The re-use of affluent water is relatively 
small in the Palestinian Territories. Waste Water Treatment Plants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
do exist, but produce relatively small amounts of water for irrigation. The 2009 Water Budget for the 
West Bank of 2009 indicates that approximately 75 MCM is extracted from the Aquifer through wells 
for domestic and agricultural use; 28.63 MCM from springs, and 51 MCM is purchased annually from 
Mekorot
16
 (PWA, 2009).  
 
This amount exceeds the 70-80 MCM/year that has been established as annual need for water for the 
Palestinian Territories under the Oslo Agreements (annex 3, article 40). Part of the larger demand can 
be explained from population growth. The Palestinian 2007 Household Census shows in the period 
following the Oslo Agreements a population growth of nearly 30% between 1997 and 2007 (PCBS, 
2008, table 7). Additionally, losses in storage, conveyance and distribution further decrease the 
realized water supply to water users from the initial amount of water extracted and treated. The 
National Strategy for Water and Waste 2011-2013 reports more than 35% water losses (PWA, 2010), 
caused by inadequate water infrastructure with leakages. In addition to illegal connections and 
destruction, this amounts to 45% of total water use in certain areas. In addition to the extraction of 
water from wells in the West Bank for Palestinian use, approximately 44 MCM of water of these 
sources are annually extracted by/for Israeli settlements (World Bank, 2009, p. 5).  
 
Gaza Strip 
The Gaza Strip faces water shortages and salinity of the ground water from shallow wells and the 
aquifer. The annual abstraction from the Coastal Aquifer in Gaza Strip is 165 MCM. Sustainable 
abstraction from the Aquifer would be only 55-65 MCM. This means an over utilization of 100-110 
MCM per year (PWA, 2009). This overexploitation of the Coastal Aquifer has resulted in lowering of 
groundwater tables, while salt water intrusion and contamination of the ground water resources with 
sewage effluent contributed to deteriorating quality of the groundwater resources in terms of its 
salinity and anthropogenic contamination. A negligible part of the water supply in Gaza Strip comes 
from desalination (1.6 MCM) and treated waste water. 4.7 MCM is annually purchased from Mekorot, 
the largest Israeli Water Supply Company. 
 
                                                          
14 Aquifers are „rocks that are capable to store and transmit water‟ (PWA, October 2009, p. 17) 
15 located in area C, to which Palestine does not have access anymore 
16 Israel‟s national water company 
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Access, reliability and quality 
Palestinians‟ access to water resources is limited by restrictions that are inherited from Oslo: 
individual Palestinians or Palestinian organizations are not permitted to drill new wells in Gaza Strip, 
West Bank area A, B, C, H1, H2 and the Eastern Segregation Zone or to extend existing ones without 
a, difficult-to-obtain, Israeli permit (IDRC 2008). In 2005, an estimated 220 Palestinian communities 
were not yet connected to a water network (Tamimi, 2005). In 2008, the number of communities not 
served had reduced to 123 communities (Census 2008; PWA, 2009, p. 20). The number of communities 
served has thereby increased from 326 (54%) in 1993 to 388 (64%) in 2005 (WB, 2009, p. 14) to 482 
(80%) in 2008 (PWA, 2009, p. 20)
17
. The coverage of water supply to the population of the West Bank 
has increased to almost 90% in 2009
18
. The latest (2009) PCBS household survey indicates an increase 
from 84.8% coverage to piped water in 1999 to 90.5% in 2005, but again a decrease (!) to 88.4% in 2009 
(PCBS, 2011, table I).  
 
The relative high connectivity does not automatically imply unlimited availability of water through 
the water network. As a result of regular intermittences and unreliability of the network, the water 
consumption is low. The estimates for per capita consumption (for domestic use) in the West Bank 
ranges from 50 liter per capita per day (lpcd) (World Bank, 2009) to 73 lpcd (B‟tselem
19
, 2011). For 
Gaza, the estimates are around 91 lpcd (B‟tselem, 2011). These estimates are 40% (West Bank)/45% 
(Gaza) below the PCBS data on daily allocation of water for domestic use per capita, which are 122.6 
lpcd for the West Bank and 169.3 lpcd for Gaza. The difference between daily per capita consumption 
and daily per capita allocation can be largely explained by the unaccounted water losses
20
.  
 
 Means of Obtaining water21 
 Public water 
network (%) 
Water 
tanks (%) 
Domestic 
wells (%) 
Other (%)  Total 
West Bank 84.5 4.3 9.6 1.6 100 
 North 
 Middle 
 South 
81.5 
98.2 
74.7 
7.5 
0.1 
8.0 
10.6 
1.2 
15.6 
0.4 
0.5 
1.7 
100 
100 
100 
Gaza 95.8 1.3 0 2.9 100 
Palestine 88.4 3.1 5.7 2.8 100 
 
Source: PCBS, 2011, table 2: Percentage Distribution of households in Palestinian Territory by Main Mean of Obtaining 
Water and Region 2009. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1619.pdf  
 
The people living in communities not served by a water network rely on spring and rain water, buy 
water from tankers, or they resort to illegal connections and shallow wells. For those who are 
                                                          
17 A complete overview of (maps of) communities served/not served per governorate, can be found in: PWA, 
October 2009. The Palestinian Water and Waste Water Sectors. Basic needs and Development. Ongoing and proposed 
projects by Governorates. Ramallah, Palestine. http://www.pwa.ps/Portals/_PWA/e4e1cac0-2b82-4d46-b494-
f38e4e4c86e4.pdf accessed 5 July 2011. 
18 When 90% of the households are connected to the water network, but only 64% of the communities, this means 
that the unconnected communities are relatively small in size, compared to the connected communities. 
19 B‟tselem is an Israeli Human Rights Organization. www.btselem.org accessed 2 July 2011 
20 Sources used by the PCBS: Population, housing and establishment census 2007 and the PWA, 2007 
unpublished data, Ramallah, Palestine. The 40-45% difference is slightly higher than the 35%-45% unaccounted 
water loss reported by PWA, due to leakages, unaccounted water connections, water theft. 
21 Due to unreliability of water supply, many people rely on multiple means to obtain water. 
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connected to a water network, the water supply is often irregular, especially during the summer 
months, and sometimes of poor quality. They rely on alternatives when no water is provided through 
the water network
22
. Even though the population in Gaza has a high connectivity, because of the poor 
water quality
23
, the population in Gaza Strip purchases additional water from private vendors; from 
water tankers; receive water at drinking water distribution points; household drinking water storage 
tanks; domestic filters (domestic reverse osmosis desalination units) and private wells. Private 
vendors operate their own wells or have licenses from the PWA (Hamas government) to operate 
wells and treat the water.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PCBS, 2011, table 3: household evaluation of water quality, 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1619.pdf. 
 
Water quality problems in Gaza are the high salinity of piped water and water from shallow wells; 
over-demineralized water from private vendors (containing too low quantities of magnesium, 
calcium and fluoride); and microbiological contamination (fecal streptococcus contamination, fecal 
coliform, and other coliform contamination). 
 
2.5 Waste Water 
Approximately one third (35.5%) of the population in the West Bank has access to a waste water 
network, while almost two-third (63.5%) relies on porous and tight cesspits for waste water disposal. 
1% has other (or no) means for waste water disposal (PCBS, 2009). In Gaza, the connection to the 
sewerage network is much higher: 83.8% of the population has access to a waste water network, 
whereas only 16% of the population depends on cesspits (PCBS, 2009). The United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has established waste water 
networks in most of the refugee camps in the West Bank. A post-2009 war report by the PCBS 
indicates that 85.3% of the population in Gaza strip has access to the sewage network (PCBS, 2009a). 
Only Khan Younis‟ population has less than 40% coverage, while all other governorates within Gaza 
                                                          
22 PWA indicates that “more than 90% of West Bank communities have intermittent water supplies, with 
interruption periods stretching from 10-15 days in general and even reaching month or more in summer time” 
(PWA, March 2010, p. 8) 
23 “Current data received from various sources indicate that less than 10% of water quantities used for drinking 
in Gaza can be considered fit for drinking, thus reflecting a disastrous environmental, social and humanitarian 
situation.” (PWA, March 2010, p. 7) Similar information is provided by OCHA-oPT that states that “Only 5-10% 
of the extracted water is safe” (OCHA-oPT, January 2011). 
24 Details concerning chemical properties (Concentration Sulphate; Nitrate; Bicarbonate; Chlorine); physical 
properties (acidity, temperature, electrical conductivity) and biological properties (pollution by total coliform 
bacteria and fecal coliform bacteria) of water wells and springs used for domestic purposes can be found in 
Palestinian National Authority - PCBS, 2009 (figures from 2007 and 2008) 
 Household evaluation of water quality24 
 Bad (%) Fairly good (%) Good (%) Total 
West Bank 7.4 20.4 72.2 100 
 North  
 Middle 
 South 
5.6 
11.0 
5.6 
20.5 
24.7 
15.1 
73.9 
64.3 
79.3 
100 
100 
100 
Gaza 63.8 29.4 6.8 100 
Palestine 28.2 23.7 48.1 100 
24 
 
Strip have 90.3 – 99.2% sewerage network coverage
25
. At the same time, the UN Organization for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Occupied Palestinian Territories (OCHA-oPT), provides a 
much more alarming picture: it states that “between 50 and 80 million liters of untreated or partially 
treated sewage discharged into the environment daily” (OCHA-oPT, January 2011).  
 
 Disposal method of waste water 
 Waste water 
network 
Porous 
cesspit 
Tight cesspit other Total 
West Bank 35.5 61.0 2.5 1.0 100 
 North 
 Middle 
 South 
34.0 
43.6 
29.5 
64.1 
51.2 
66.7 
1.7 
4.6 
1.5 
0.2 
0.6 
2.3 
100 
100 
100 
Gaza 83.3 16.0 0 0.2 100 
Palestine 52.1 45.5 1.7 0.7 100 
 
Source: PCBS, 2009. Percentage Distribution of Households in Palestine by Waste Water Disposal Method and Region, 
2009.  
 
The National Sector Strategy for Water and Waste Water in Palestine (2011-2013) indicates that waste 
water quantities (approximately 106 MCM per year) are almost equally spread between the West 
Bank (50 MCM) and Gaza (56 MCM). In addition, according to Palestinian sources, an estimated 39 
MCM of untreated waste water is discharged by settlements and their industrial zones (PWA, March 
2010, p. 8). At present, 4 treatment plants have  been established by the Palestinian Authorities, of 
which 3 in Gaza Strip and one in Al Bireh in the West Bank. Treatment capacities are relatively small 
(35 MCM per year from the ones in Gaza; 2 MCM per year in the West Bank). New plants (Beit 
Hanoun, Beit Lahia, Gaza City) are under construction, or waiting approval from the Israeli Civil 
Administration. The Palestinian Authority faces the following constraints in construction of treatment 
plants: 
 The length of the procedures required for approving treatment plant projects (years); 
 Israel‟s conditionality to link the Palestinian Treatment Plants to settlements, which are illegal 
according to international law
26
. 
 Standards above standards applied to similar Israeli facilities and above WHO requirements
27
 
resulting in high construction and operation costs 
 Discouragement of donors due to these constraints. 
 Limited availability of land for waste water treatment in area A and B. 
 
Given the importance of waste water services and treatment facilities, the Palestinian Authority is 
well aware of the need for a clear strategy for waste water treatment. Strategic objective III of the 
National Sector Strategy therefore aims at: “Integrated waste water management which ensures 
equitable and continuous services, contributes to preserving public health and safeguards the 
                                                          
25 One can observe some variability between figures on waste water network connection, depending 
on the source (census PCBS; PWA; policy papers). Here, we have chosen for figures from the census 
by PCBS, since these are expected to come closest to the reality, even though the report does not refer 
to any damage of the latest war on the sewerage network (PCBS, 2009). For that, see PCBS, 2009a. 
26 Art. 46, the Hague Convention; Art. 49, par. 6, 4th Geneva Convention; UN security Council Resolution 446 
(1979); UN Security Council Resolution 465 (1980); 2004 ruling of the International Court of Justice. 
27 These standards are laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Guidelines and Technical 
Criteria for Sewerage Projects, signed on December 31, 2003, by the Israeli-Palestinian “Joint Water Committee”. 
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environment” (PWA, March 2010, p. 14). This includes a policy to “connect residential communities 
with waste water collection networks” and a policy to “Build waste water collection and treatment 
plants” including local and district systems for the reuse of treated wastewater, and programs to 
encourage farmers to reuse treated waste water‟ (PWA, March 2010, p. 14). 
 
2.6 Solid waste management 
Until 1994, municipalities and village councils were controlled by the Israeli Civil Administration 
(ICA) and the IDF. Due to the direct influence of ICA‟s military and political controls, the services 
provided by local Palestinian authorities were mostly unsatisfactory, especially in solid waste 
management.  The local Palestinian authorities were not able to solve the solid waste problems in the 
area by themselves, due to lack of knowledge and experience. Furthermore, the Second Intifada had a 
major impact on solid waste management: during this period, the Palestinian Authority and the 
Israeli Authority hardly cooperated.  
 
Solid waste services under the Israeli occupation were limited to the municipalities in urban areas, 
while the village councils in rural areas did not have any role in this regard. The collected wastes by 
the municipalities were mostly disposed in uncontrolled landfills. In rural areas, due to lack of solid 
waste services, the citizens disposed the wastes in roadsides and empty lands close to the populated 
areas. During these years of the second Intifada, the UN serviced people in West Bank. NGOs played 
a major role in alleviating the solid waste issue and worked with municipalities, village councils, and 
informal networks to develop and improve the solid waste services through the establishment of 
informal networks and clusters. A rather informal management of waste was therefore 
institutionalized during this time period.  
 
The solid waste produced in Palestinian Territories is currently estimated at 78,644 tons per month 
and encompasses there types of waste: residential waste from households (70,597 tons/month); waste 
from health care centers (1,202 tons/month), and waste from industrial establishments (7,807 
tons/month). Organic waste constitutes approximately 80% of the residential waste
28
. The 
importance of good Solid Waste Management has gained significant attention by the Palestinian 
government in recent years, and a number of objectives have been achieved, such as the 
establishment of a number of regional sanitary landfills (the Zahrat Al-Funjan landfill in Jenin, 
described in this report; the Jericho landfill; and the Deir-El-Balah landfill in Gaza Strip). Other 
achievements are the closure of uncontrolled and illegal dumps; the passage of a number of relevant 
laws for Solid Waste Management
29
; and improvement of solid waste infrastructure (waste collection, 
transport and disposal facilities). At the same time, the SWM sector faced a range of obstacles, which 
are summarized in the next section on institutional structure.  
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Figures from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009.See also PNA, 2010. National Strategy for Solid 
Waste Management in Palestinian Territory 2010-2014. Ramallah, Palestine. 
29 Law No. 1, 1997 regarding Local Government; Environmental Law No. 7, 1999; Public Health Law 2004. (PNA, 
May 2010) 
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2.7 Institutional structures 
 
Institutional structure for the water sector 
The institutional structure for the water sector in Palestinian Territory is shaped through the history 
of events before and after the Oslo Process. Before the Oslo Agreements, the West Bank Water 
Department was the largest water distributor in the West Bank. This department was established as 
part of the Jordanian Natural Resources Authority in 1966, but administered by the Israel Civil 
Administration (linked to the Israel Defense Forces) when Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967 
(Birzeit University, 2004). One of the first agreements towards the establishment of Palestinian 
Authorities was the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in 1993. Art. 
VII (4) of this Declaration refers to the establishment of a Palestinian Water Authority. The Interim 
Agreement of 1995 (known as Oslo II) facilitated the transfer for responsibilities to the Palestinian 
Water Authorities (PWA). The water allocation, the responsibilities related to water management and 
waste water management, and the joint water committee are all addressed in the Transitional Stage 
Agreement (Oslo II), Annex 3
30
. Some of the most important issues are, however, not addressed 
which also affect the success of MSP projects studied for this research. Art. 40, sub 4 and 5 refer to the 
transfer of authority:  
 
1. “The Israeli side shall transfer to the Palestinian side, and the Palestinian side shall assume, 
powers and responsibilities in the sphere of water and sewage in the West Bank related solely 
to Palestinians, that are currently held by the military government and its Civil 
Administration, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article.  
2. The issue of ownership of water and sewage related infrastructure in the West Bank will be 
addressed in the permanent status negotiations” (Oslo II, annex 3, art. 40, sub 4, 5). 
 
Moreover, art. 40 sub 6 states that “Both sides have agreed that the future needs of the Palestinians in 
the West Bank are estimated to be between 70 – 80 MCM/year”, for the interim period of 5 years. 
  
In succession of the Oslo Agreements, the Palestinian National Authority drafted and approved 
relevant laws. The PWA was established by Presidential Decree No. 90 of 1995, and according to 
Water Law No. 2 of 1996
31
: PWA will have an independent legal stature, independent budget and 
report to the President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and has a head of operations 
designated by the President of the PNA. Since 2006, PWA reports to the Council of Ministers. Water 
law no. 3, 2002 declares all water resources to be public property; PWA is responsible for 
management of both the water and wastewater sector in addition to the projects associated with 
them. All water and waste water projects (digging of wells, exploration, extraction, collection, 
desalination, water treatment, establishment of water and waste water facility must initially obtain 
permit from PWA
32
. A study by Birzeit University indicates: “It is responsible for “ensuring and 
overseeing the efficiency and compliance of these activities and projects initially and during 
operation, according to approved regulations, specifications and standards. It is also responsible for 
                                                          
30  The main issues are addressed in the Protocol concerning Civil Affairs‟, Article IV: Special provisions 
concerning area C; article 40, „water and sewage‟. More specific arrangements are: schedule 8 (Joint Water 
Committee), 9 (Supervision and Enforcement Mechanism), 10 (Data concerning aquifers) and 11 (The Gaza Strip). 
September 1995. The text of this law can be found at http://www.pwa.ps/Portals/_PWA/article40.pdf  accessed 
20/6/2011 and www.mideastweb.org/intanx3.htm accessed 20/6/2011 
31 The text of this law can be found at: http://www.pwa.ps/Portals/_PWA/ByLawNo2.pdf accessed 20/6/2011 
32 This law can be found at: http://www.pwa.ps/Portals/_PWA/water%20law3-2002.pdf accessed 20/6/2011. 
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administering the construction, operation, and maintenance of waste water and reuse systems which 
will be done by regional utilities with the various levels of coordination and involvement of other 
PNA organizations, such as the ministry of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry 
of Local Government and the Palestinian Water Authority” (Birzeit University et al,  2004, p. 12). 
 
While the PWA is responsible for water supply and management, regulation of water management, 
supervision, and setting a framework for tariffs within which municipalities have to operate, 
municipalities are responsible for water management (organization, treatment, distribution, pricing) 
within their boundaries. This is arranged by Local Authorities Law no. 1, 1997, that states that local 
authorities are responsible for managing services, including water (drinking water). Some of the 
larger municipalities and towns tend to have water departments within their municipality and have 
set up independent non-profit institutions for water supply, such as the Jerusalem Water Undertaken 
(Ramallah and Al-Bireh District); the Water and Sanitation Authority (Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit 
Sahur)
33
; and the Joint Services Water Council for West Jenin. (Birzeit University, 2004).  
 
The Palestinian water sector is characterized by a variety of constraints, both related to the occupation 
by Israel, domestic constraints and weaknesses of the water sector itself. These are: (a) lack of control 
by the PA over Palestinian Water resources and infrastructure; (b) constraints inherent in the 
functioning of the Joint Water Committee and permit procedures that hamper or delay investments in 
the construction and rehabilitation of water infrastructure; (c) institutional and human resources, in 
particular in the field of technical, administrative, and logistic expertise; (d) lack of coordination 
between related institutions; (e) financial deficits and mismanagement; (f) high percentage of water 
that is not accounted for; (g) ineffective fee collection (below 50%) and governments‟ debts on service 
providers; (h) no unified tariffs, taxing and pricing procedures; (i) poor operational performance and 
cost recovery; (i) fragmentation of policies, plans and actions from various actors; (j) disconnected 
infrastructure at remote locations; (k) demand-supply gap; and unsustainable extraction from the 
aquifer; (l) 123 communities not served; (m) poor wastewater collection and treatment
34
. The World 
Bank reports the following constraints stemming from Oslo and the occupation: 
1. “The Joint Water Committee (JWC) has not fulfilled its role of providing an effective 
collaborative governance framework for joint resource management and investment”: 50% 
(by value; worth US$ 60.4 million) of the Palestinian projects presented to JWC in the 2001- 
2008 period have been approved; 
2. “The JWC does not function as a „joint‟ water resource governance institution because of 
fundamental asymmetries – of power, of capacity, of information, of interests – that prevent 
the development of a consensual approach to resolving water management conflicts”;  
3. “Civil Administration rules place additional constraints on Area C planning and investment”. 
“The Civil Administration requirements on effluent quality and connection of settlements 
have prevented all but one waste water treatment plant from going ahead”; 
4. “Taken together, the operation of the JWC, Civil Administration rules; the physical M&A 
restrictions, the institutional weaknesses of the PA and the shortfalls in aid effectiveness have 
reduced the development of water resources and services for Palestinian people below levels 
expected at the time of Oslo” (World Bank, 2009, p. ix). 
                                                          
33 “There are five large utilities in the West Bank: Hebron, Nablus, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Qalqilya. Of these, only 
Jerusalem Water Undertaking and the Bethlehem Utility are set up as fully autonomous legal and financial 
entities”. (World Bank, 2009, p. 91) 
34 Summary from: Palestinian Water Authority, October 2009, p. 18-20. An overview of additional strengths, 
weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats can be found in, PWA, undated. Executive Summary for the Strategic 
Water Sector Plan in Palestine 2011-2013. www.pwa.ps, under „Resources‟, „library‟. Accessed 11 July 2011. 
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Institutional structure for solid waste management 
Since the emergence of Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, laws and regulations were enacted to 
govern the work of local authorities to improve the public services in this array.  The Ministry of 
Local Government became the regulator of municipalities and village councils work, while the 
Ministry of Environment Affairs takes the responsibility of environmental issues at national level. At 
present, three Ministries play a key role in solid waste management within Palestinian Territories:  
 Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG): coordinating lead ministry, has the overall 
responsibility and does surveillance for relevant functions of local authorities; 
 Ministry of Planning: does overall planning and funding in coordination with line 
ministries; 
 Environmental Quality Authority (EQA): is responsible for environmental monitoring, 
expertise, environmental protection, and licensing of sites, after getting permits from 
Israeli authorities.  
 
Regional solid waste councils and municipalities have a responsibility in the establishment of solid 
waste treatment facilities, under the supervision of MoLG. Solid waste providers at municipal level 
are: local councils, contractors, joint service councils, City; and UNRWA.  
 
One of the key problems in the solid waste sector is the collection of fees. A study on Solid waste 
management in Nablus District revealed that the cost of collection and disposal of each ton is 
approximately 53 US$, and that the fees collected contributed to less than 20% (!) of the money 
needed to run the services (UNEP 2003). According to the same study, 40-70% of the residents do not 
pay their annual SWM fees (Al Khatib et al. 2010, p. 1135) due to the economic situation. The National 
Strategy for Solid Waste Management (SWM) in the Palestinian Territories 2010-2014
35
 identified 8 
strategic goals in response to these and other constraints (PNA, May 2010, p. 17-24). These are: 
1. An effective legal and organizational framework for SWM; 
2. Strong and capable institutions; 
3. Effective and environmentally safe management of SW services; 
4. Financially viable and efficient SWM service and activities; 
5. Principles and mechanisms suitable for managing medical, hazardous and special wastes; 
6. Increasing the participation of the private sector; 
7. A more participating and aware community;  
8. Effective information and monitoring systems. 
 
The case study of the Zahrat al Finjan Landfill fits, first and foremost, strategic goal 3: effective and 
environmentally safe management of SW services; although a number of other strategic goals are also 
addressed: (4) financially viable and efficient SWM services and activities; (7) a more participating 
community; and (8) effective information and monitoring systems. 
 
Aid Coordination Mechanisms 
Bilateral and multilateral donors are involved in a variety of coordination mechanisms in various 
sectors, through the Local Development Forum, the Economic Strategy Group; the Infrastructure 
Strategy Group; the Social Development Strategy Group and the Governance Strategy Group. For a 
                                                          
35 Decree no. 13/49/05 called for a National Strategy for Solid Waste Management in the Palestinian Territory 
2010-2014 (NSSWM); This National Strategy is the result of joint efforts by multiple ministries and national 
entities involved in the SW sector, supported by the „Deutscher Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit‟ 
(GTZ) – the German Agency for International Cooperation.  
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recent overview, see: LACS (2011). International NGOs and donors that are involved in water and 
sanitation are coordinating their efforts in the Association of International Development Agencies 
(AIDA), in the Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Group (EWASH), the Consolidated Appeal 
Process for the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT), and in OCHA WATSAN meetings and in 
OCHA Area C Working Group Meetings. 
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3. Case study 1: Well Rehabilitation in Tulkarem and 
Qalqiliya 
 
 
Socio-economic context 
The socio-economic situation at Qalqilyia and Tulkarem area is currently characterized by a high rate 
of unemployment; around 60% of the people living there were forced to leave their jobs during the 
second intifada (2000-2004). Before the second intifada, most of these men used to work as 
construction workers inside Israel. Today they work as farmers after they lost their jobs. Additional 
factors that affect the social economic situation in the area are  
1. the loss of land and constraints to access their lands;  
2. the lack of water and constrained access to water to irrigate their land;  
3. the low prices for their products on the market compared to the costs of cultivation; and  
4. migration. 
 
Ad. 1 Many farmers lost their lands because of the separation wall. At several places, the wall has 
been constructed on Palestinian lands, while in other cases the Israeli army has designated some 
lands within the West Bank as „closed‟ areas. This has been part of the Israeli zoning and planning of 
the occupied territories, leaving the Palestinian farmers without work or land (UN OCHA-oPT, May 
2009)36. Since 2003, the land between the Wall and the Green Line in Tulkarem and Qalqiliya has been 
assigned as „closed‟ areas. Closures, although carefully monitored by national and international 
organizations37, directly affect people‟s life. OCHA-oPT reports that “„Seam zone‟ residents are 
physically separated from the rest of the West Bank and from health, education and commercial 
services which are generally located to the east of the Barrier” (UN OCHA oPT, 2009, p.13).  
 
Some of famers still struggle to keep the land, either by going to court, or by cultivating the land. The 
farmers do not have much choice; if they leave their land without planting or use, they will lose their 
right of keeping the land
38
. Due to the location of their land behind the separation wall, farmers have 
to cross the check point to go to their lands. This is not easy, since they are forced to go in at certain 
hours and come back before 7 pm local time and they require a permit from the Israeli security to be 
allowed to go to their land. Many of the farmers stay on their land to protect the crops from the Israeli 
soldiers or the settlers. Israeli soldiers and settlers have been reported to destroy the plants or burn 
them during the night.  
                                                          
36 OCHA oPT reports that “In January 2009, the Israeli authorities issued military orders declaring the area 
between the Barrier and the Green Line in Hebron and parts of the Salfit, Ramallah, Jerusalem and northern 
Bethlehem governorates as a closed military area („seam zone‟). These are the first such orders to be issued since 
October 2003, when all of the land between the Barrier and the Green Line in the Jenin, Tulkarem and Qalqiliya 
governorates was designed „closed‟. „Seam zone‟ residents are physically separated from the rest of the West 
Bank and from health, education and commercial services which are generally located to the east of the Barrier” 
(UN OCHA oPT, 2009, p.13). 
37 An overview of closures and mobility restrictions can be found on www.ochaopt.org,  
UN OCHA oPT, June 2010. West Bank Closure Map.East Jerusalem oPT. 
UN OCHA oPT. June 2010. West Bank Movement and Access Update.East Jerusalem, oPT. 
UN OCHA oPT. July 2007. The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other 
Infrastructure in the West Bank.East Jerusalem, oPT.  
38 See context analysis 
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Ad 2. One of the major problems these farmers used to face was the lack of water, as they could not 
irrigate their land behind the separation wall. This resulted in financial difficulties (debts) and thereby 
social tensions. Droughts; leakages and losses through the water net on one side and poor water 
management by the Authority on the other side further contributed to deterioration of the 
agricultural situation. The loss of employment, the constrained access to land and water resulted in an 
increase of the percentage of poverty in the post-intifada years.  The percentage of the poverty in 
Qalqilyia and Tulkarem was 24% in 2009 (UN, 2009) 
 
Ad 3. Farmers were, and are, still losing money working in their lands. This is not only due to lack of 
water for irrigation, but also the restricted accessibility of the land. After closure of the land between 
the Green Line and construction of the Wall in 2003, farmers from Tulkarem and Qalqilyia were not 
allowed to go to their lands to cultivate their lands as they were before. For those who did manage to 
harvest some crops such as tomato, or cucumber, many products were spoilt by being held on the 
check points for hours without cooling equipment. Another major reason why farmers lose money 
when cultivating, is related to the market advantages for Israeli products. Those are subsidized and - 
given the constant water availability in the settlements - arrive on the markets well before the 
Palestinian products do. This greatly reduces the economic viability of cultivating and selling 
agricultural products. Several Palestinian farmers therefore started selling their lands for construction 
activities  
 
Ad 4. Some farmers left their land and immigrate to other countries for work 
 
Institutional situation: legislation and regulations 
Qalqilyia and Tulkarem area were divided into area A and C based on the Oslo agreement (see also 
context analysis). Most of the irrigation land as well as the irrigation wells are located in area C. The 
Rehabilitation of the irrigation wells in the northern part of West Bank was needed. Connecting the 
rehabilitation wells with electricity and bringing new pumps to these wells located behind the wall, 
proved to be very challenging. The political situation requires permits from the Civilian 
Administration of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to bring new water pumps to the area between the 
Wall and the Green Line. This area is designated as area C, so Palestinians are not able to do or 
construct anything in this area without a permit from the Israeli Authority. The donor organization 
(ECHO), together with PWA and MoA, played a major role in this project because together they were 
able to put more pressure on the Israeli Authority in their requests for the permits required. The 
donor‟s main overall objective was to assist the farmers on long and short term run. The project 
exemplifies how donors played a role beyond funding a project. Their involvement in pressuring the 
Israeli Authority to issue the permits needed to implement and complete any project can serve as a 
positive example for extensive donor involvement in MSPs for service delivery. 
 
3.1 Characteristics of the MSP 
3.1.1  Initiation and origin 
The groundwater wells rehabilitation program (agricultural wells) covered several regions in the 
West Bank including Qalqilyia (Figure 2) and Tulkarem area
39
. In the study area, farmers faced 
several problems related to the water use and management of the wells. One of these problems was 
                                                          
39 Detailed and updated maps (July 2010) of Qalqiliya and Tulkarem are available at www.ochaopt.org under 
„map centre‟ (choose „closure maps‟) 
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pumping beyond the safe yield. When this happened, not everyone was able to receive enough water 
to irrigate their lands. Moreover, the availability of water also decreased as a result of unaccounted 
water losses, both through leakage and illegal connections.  
 
In 2003, a group of farmers from Qalqilyia and Tulkarem area sent applications to the village council 
asking for urgent intervention to help them rehabilitate some of their irrigation wells to use them 
again for irrigation purposes. While initially, the rehabilitation of irrigation wells did not have a high 
priority for the village council, this changed after the separation wall was built in at Qalqilyia and 
Tulkarem in 2002; farmers risked losing their lands if they could not irrigate the land and cultivate 
it.
40
 The high price of water contributed to the abandonment of land by 123 farmers, resulting in 
570,000 m2 (= 570 dunums) uncultivated, of which 480 dunums in area C, and 90 dunums in the seam 
zone (European Commission; Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid - ECHO, 2010, p. 8). 
 
The Village Council contacted the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) to assist them for the 
rehabilitation of these wells. The PHG wrote a proposal and submitted this to the EU and other 
funding organisations, and received the funds to rehabilitate the wells as requested. The project that 
resulted from this action was titled: „Urgent Action to secure access of the population in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories‟ and completely funded by the Directorate- General for Humanitarian Aid  of 
the European Commission: ECHO.  
 
Subsequently, the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) attracted the attention of all stakeholders who 
could contribute to the rehabilitation of groundwater wells, by inviting some farmers and the owners 
of the wells to the Municipality and discuss their problems. A detailed Needs Assessment revealed 
the complexity of the problems and how technical, managerial and political aspects interact. The 
Needs Assessment among farmers, well owners, domestic users, and municipalities indicated that the 
area faces: (a) frequent interruption of water supply for domestic and agricultural use; ranging from a 
couple of days to two-third of the year; (b) excessive operation costs due to high expenditure for 
repairs and fuel prices; (c)  high debts among well owners and municipalities running the wells; (d) 
Limited well-capacity: many wells are not operational or below their maximum capacity, due to 
contamination by sewage water and flooding from settlements; limited pump capacity ; and the use 
of old equipment and leaking pumping pipes; (e) insufficient water supply to cover the needs of the 
communities, (f) increasing dependency of households on water tankers which increases costs of 
living
41
; (f) decreased agricultural productivity due to the abandonment of land; and (g) lack of skills 
among well owners and operators (such as limited knowledge to anticipate technical deficiencies; 
lack of monitoring of costs, production and consumption patterns). (Asamblea de Cooperacion por la 
Paz; PHG, 2010, p. 6-8). 
 
These problems are visualized in the figure below. 
                                                          
40 Land not cultivated, and land of refugees, can become property of the Israeli state (Amit, 2009). An Israeli court 
ruled in 2009, that Israeli law can also be applied to property East of the 1967 border (Haaretz, 2 August 2009). 
Abandoned land and absentee property is addressed in Israeli Law by:  
 the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, http://www.archive.org/stream/ottomanlandcode00turkuoft/ accessed 
12 August 2011; 
 the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste [uncultivated] Lands, Extension of Validity)  
 Ordinance No. 36 OF 5709-1949; http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=762;  
 the Emergency Regulations regarding the Cultivation of Fallow Lands and Unexploited Water Sources;  
 the Absentees‟ Property Law, 5710-1950, March 14, 1950.  
41 The price of water from tankers in the area (18 NIS/ m3) compared to water from the network (max. 3 NIS/m3) 
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Source: Asamblea de Cooperacion por la Paz; PHG, 2010, p. 5. 
 
 
3.1.2 Objectives  
The principal objective as formulated by the multiple stakeholders was: “to improve access of 
vulnerable population to agricultural and domestic water by improving the water infrastructure and 
the key water managers‟ abilities” (EC, DG for Humanitarian Aid – ECHO, 2007, p. 24).  
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Source: Asamblea de Cooperacion por la Paz (ACPP); PHG, 2010, p. 8.  
This would then contribute to diminishing the dependence of families on tankered water and increase 
cultivation of lands that were sensitive to confiscation in case of abandonment. 
 
 
3.1.3 MSP actors 
The organizations that acted as members of the MSP, were:  
1. Farmers and ground water well owners,  
2. Village councils and Municipalities within Qalqilyia (Qalqilia city, Azoon Atmeh, Hableh, 
Ras Ateya, Azoon, Jayous, and Salamieh)and Tulkarem areas (Tulkarm City, Faroon, 
Sisareen, Shwekeh, Ateel, Deer Al-Gsoun, and Al-nazleh Al-Sharkiah);  
3. Governmental Organizations at national level: the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). The Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC), the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Ramallah; and the Environmental 
Quality Authority (EQA) cooperated where relevant. 
4. Non-Governmental Organizations: Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG); and EWASH
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5. International organizations: EU‟s Humanitarian Aid department ECHO; Asamblea de 
Cooperacion por la Paz (a Spanish NGO) and the United Nations Organization for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the occupied Palestinian Territories (OCHA-oPT). 
 
It is important to realize that the MSP projects in Qalqilyia and Tulkarem did not have the same 
composition over time. There were always progressive changes in the MSP membership and level of 
participation, due to the participatory approach used as a tool for projects success and sustainability. 
In this project, multiple stakeholders started already working together in the early nineties, with only 
a few farmers and wells‟ owners. The rehabilitation of wells gained importance on the political 
agenda, and the top-down administrative commitment from the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and 
the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) followed from a strong motivation of local partners.   
 
PHG played a key role in the project and communication with members of the MSP. It was in charge 
of day-to-day implementation, for the socio-economic assessment, for organizing meetings and 
maintaining contacts with local authorities, farmers, cooperatives, well owners and national 
organizations, for coordinating the tender procedures and selection of contractors, for financial 
accounting and management, and for provision of technical specifications for rehabilitation works, all 
of which has been monitored by ACPP.  
                                                          
42 The Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene group (EWASH) is a coalition of almost 30 organisations 
(including international and national NGOs and UN Agencies) working in the water and sanitation sector. 
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Source: (adjusted from) EC-DG ECHO, 2010, p. 6-7 
 
The MSP in this project included civil society organizations or local groups, governmental and non-
governmental representatives. While there is no rule which says this project should include these 
partners, it has proven to be very effective.  
 Interests Involvement in MSP Influence / Responsible for: 
ACPP Promote and enhance 
access to basic needs 
(water) by vulnerable 
sections of Palestinian 
population; decrease risk 
of confiscation of ands 
Applicant organization, 
involvement in selection of 
wells together with PWA, 
MoA; participation in 
design of actions, 
monitoring of intervention 
of project 
Responsible for grant awarded. 
Final decision-maker regarding 
crucial questions. Participation 
in coordination mechanisms 
with other stakeholders  
PHG Improve access to water 
and sanitation, support 
local good governance in 
the water and sanitation 
sector, promote sustainable 
environmental 
management in Palestine 
Key role and  involvement 
in all phases of the project 
In charge of day-to-day 
implementation of the project, 
responsible with ACPP for 
tendering, procurement, 
technical clearance, organizing 
meetings, communication 
Well owners Increase water discharge 
(in m3/h), decrease of 
operation and maintenance 
costs of the wells 
Participation in the design 
through engagement in 
needs assessment, 
facilitation of rehabilitation 
works; training. 
Appropriate use and adequate 
maintenance of equipment 
supplied by project 
Farmers Increased availability of 
water and at lower prices 
to ensure irrigation of land 
vulnerable to 
abandonment and thereby 
confiscation 
Participation in the design 
through needs assessment, 
participation in training 
Proper use of water, 
commitment to continue 
irrigation of land despite 
potential difficulties; 
commitment to re-cultivate 
abandoned land 
Municipalities 
/ village 
councils 
Increased capacity and 
efficiency of wells for 
domestic and mixed use; 
safe and adequate water 
supply for local population 
participation in design; 
responsible for water 
supply and quality at local 
level; participation in 
training courses 
Regulation of local water supply 
through bylaws, monitoring of 
water quality tests; proper 
use/maintenance of equipment 
where village councils and 
municipalities are well owners. 
PWA Ensuring sustainability of 
the project; integration of 
project in PWA‟s medium 
term strategy on water and 
sanitation 
participation in the design; 
coordination of actions and 
meetings with ACPP and 
PHG 
Main regulating institution for 
W&S in the West Bank through 
policies; coordination of actions 
related to procedures and 
permits  
EWASH To guarantee coordination 
between stakeholders in 
water and sanitation and 
other sectors; to improve 
efficiency and quality of 
actions 
Participation through 
consultation and close 
work with NGOs, 
including PHG and ACPP 
Continuous coordination 
between stakeholders improves 
and facilitates sustainability and 
efficiency of the proposed 
project 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Ensure sustainability of the 
project, incorporate the 
approach in medium term 
strategy in agriculture 
participation in the design; 
coordination of actions and 
meetings with both ACPP 
and PHG 
Main regulating institution for 
agricultural issues through 
ratification of policies. 
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3.1.4 Activities and Approach  
The activities of the MSP should be seen in relation to a range of interventions by ACPP in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The program areas that are supported by ACPP are: (a) water and 
sanitation; (b) agriculture and food security; (c) health and  (d) human rights. The rehabilitation of 
wells in Qalqiliya and Tulkarem address primarily ACPP‟s objective to “promote and enhance the 
capacities of vulnerable sections of the Palestinian population to cope with water shortage suffered as a 
consequence of the measures imposed by Israel”, but also contribute to the production of crops by 
Palestinian farmers, another strategic intervention by ACPP (EC-ECHO, 2010, p. 15). The project for 
rehabilitation of wells in Qalqiliya and Tulkarem that started in 2004, together with PHG, funded 
only by the European Commission Directorate General Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), is one of a range 
of projects by ACPP that address the poor water infrastructure. Reduction of the risk of the 
confiscation of land by abandonment is one of the explicit objectives, both by all stakeholders 
involved: both by international actors (ACPP), by national actors (ministries), NGOs and local 
stakeholders. The activities undertaken by members of the MSP were:  
 needs assessment; socio-economic assessment;  
 a domestic and agricultural water access profile per municipality/village council; 
 pre-selection and selection of the wells for rehabilitation;  
 procurement for rehabilitation; rehabilitation of pumps and wells; 
 training of farmers, well owners, and municipalities in: agricultural cooperative management, 
water management and irrigation, and in operation and maintenance;  
 monitoring and reporting; and  
 a visibility program.  
 
The prioritization of wells was based on (a) access to land and water, isolation, barriers and 
constraints due to the route of the wall, checkpoints and settlements); (b) an assessment of the socio-
economic situation in each of the areas where the wells are located; (c) confiscation and annexation of 
abandoned land; (d) the location of the wells in area A, B or C; (e) technical condition of the well and 
(f) whether alternative sources of water were available.  
 
 
Figure: Prioritized wells. Source: Asamblea de Cooperacion por la Paz; Palestinian Hydrology Group, 
2010 (Annex 1, Needs Assessment), p. 11. 
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Although 20 wells were initially included in the field visits for the needs-assessment, 6 wells were 
already part of projects funded by the Palestinian Energy Authority and therefore excluded. Only 4  
of these 14 prioritized wells are rehabilitated through the efforts of the MSP with funding from DG-
ECHO. The rehabilitation of other wells has been proposed to other donors. The final report indicates 
that further selection of wells for rehabilitation was informed by the “number of beneficiaries for 
domestic and agricultural use; number of dunums irrigated by the well; risk of interruption of well 
operation due to technical problems; risk of well interruption due to operation and maintenance 
costs; use for domestic purposes” (EC-ECHO, 2010, p. 20).  
 
3.1.5 Funding 
The money allocated by DG ECHO was 300,000 Euros. This has been divided over two result areas:  
1. Rehabilitation of groundwater wells (resulting in improved access to water for domestic and 
agricultural use); rehabilitation aimed at (a) guaranteed functioning for 5-8 years; (b) an 
increase of discharge capacities and an increase of water supply of 40% and (c) a reduction of 
running costs of 32%; 
2. Capacity building and training on operation and maintenance, water management and 
irrigation techniques (farmers, well owners, technicians and municipality/village councils) . 
 
When it became clear that the contract work for the first result area (rehabilitation of wells) was done 
at 270,778.75 Euro, below the budgeted amount, ACPP and PHG decided to use the remaining money 
to extend some of the works (replacement of a booster pump and control panel pumping fittings at 
the booster site of the An Nazla ash Sharqiya well). For training and capacity building an amount was 
budgeted of 9,809.75 Euros. Other costs were the visibility program (initially 626.34, reduced to 259 
Euros) and indirect costs (estimated at 19,626.17). The total expenditure was thereby 300,473.88 Euros. 
The missing 473.88 was created by sale of tender documentation. (EC, DG ECHO, 2010, p. 67).  
 
 
3.2 Governance of the MSP 
 
The members of the MSP were involved in the project during several stages of the project. The 
beneficiaries mostly in the beginning (during the needs assessment) and as participants in some of the 
trainings; the institutional stakeholders during all stages of the projects. While the tasks of ACPP 
(project coordinator, and water technical expert) and PHG (project coordinator, field engineers, the 
PHG administrator and socio-economic expert) have been clearly specified
43
 (EC ECHO, 2010, p. 64-
66), the larger MSP as such did not have a clear spokesperson or structure. Some of the more specific 
tasks were performed by: 
 Planning and Management: The Palestinian Hydrology Group played a major role, together 
with ACPP and the donors, to plan and manage the project. 
 Communication and reporting: the ACPP expatriate project coordinator acted as focal point 
for coordination of action. PHG informed ACPP on a monthly basis of the progress, 
achievements and constraints, through monthly narrative reports and previously established 
indicators. 
 Contacts with farmers: initially, these contacts were established through the needs-
assessment and socio-economic assessment. During the project, farmers addressed their 
                                                          
43 PHG and ACPP signed an Memorandum of Understanding including a specification of their 
respective roles in the project. 
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needs, requests and complaints to staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Palestinian 
Water Authority. Communication was enhanced through extensive field visits by staff from 
PHG, MoA, PWA and its engineers. 
 Revenues: The Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for charging the farmers monthly fees 
(10nis/month) in order to keep up the services related to the rehabilitated wells.  
 Signing Agreements: The PHG was responsible for discussing and signing agreements with 
farmers, and well owners. To ensure the sustainability, well owners were requested to 
commit – through a formal agreement - to proper maintenance of equipments supplied by the 
project, to maintenance of the well; to rehabilitate the well house; and to agree with the PWA 
tariff structure. For this, they signed an agreement (MoU). 
 Controller: The Palestinian Water Authority; the Ministry of Agriculture; the Palestinian 
Hydrology Group and the ACPP expatriate project officer; were acting as controller of inputs 
and outputs of project and were accountable to ECHO. 
 Technical control: Field Engineers at PHG‟s Nablus office worked closely together with the 
Local Water Expert from ACPP to ensure that the rehabilitations and specifications for 
equipment and spare parts were technical sound 
 Problem solving: PHG was and still working with the localities in trying to solve the 
inheritance of the irrigation wells.  Several people started claiming ownership to the 
rehabilitated wells, after these wells start generating some financial benefits. 
 Permits: The PWA and Ministry of Agriculture, worked together to get permits from the Civil 
Administration.  
 
Decision-making and supervision 
To facilitate the initial decision-making and supervisory process, a Steering Committee was 
established. The Steering Committee was responsible for monitoring, supervising, and advising the 
implementing organizations. It consisted of ACPP‟s Expatriate coordinator, the local WATSAN expert 
(ACPP), the Local Project Coordinator (PHG) and Monitoring and Evaluation Expert (PHG) with 
support from the Director of Water Quality at PWA, and the Director of Water Department at the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). The Steering Committee was involved in: 
 Reviewing the work plan; 
 Review FPA and ECHO guidelines and procedures; 
 Discussion of the methodology for implementation; 
 Drafting a plan of action with field visits; 
 Discussion of methodology of the technical and socio-economic surveys. 
 
Meetings and discussions 
To facilitate meetings with local councils and well owners, extensive field visits were organized to the 
selected areas of intervention. These field visits took place during the initial phase of needs 
assessment and socio-economic surveys, but were repeated in the implementation phase. At national 
level, several meetings were conducted with PWA and MoA to seek their support, to discuss the 
interventions, and to discuss progress in terms of the procedures for requesting permits from the Joint 
Water Committee.  When the permit from the JWC for rehabilitation of the wells was still not issued 
by August 2009, ECHO requested ACPP to seek formal approval and written support from PWA 
before continuation with the project.  
 
Accountability 
Communication, reporting and the final accountability towards the funding agency, ECHO, was with 
ACPP. Decisions regarding procurement procedures; the selection and employment of experts, and 
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contracting materials, machinery and labour therefore required agreement from ACPP (EC DG-
ECHO, 2010, p. 59). The final accountability of the MSP‟s activities at national level was with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Palestinian Water Authority. One constraint that was emphasized in 
this case study, were the predetermined conditions in the call for proposals by donor organizations. 
These conditions – it was said – constrain the MSP members and beneficiaries in their choice of 
implementation, procurement and thereby result in less ownership, and sometimes in sub-optimal 
output. 
 
Relevance of cooperation for project success 
The MSP-members were able to ensure good co-operation between the state institutions, donors 
(ECHO and OCHA-oPT) and other organizations throughout the project and formulated a plan of 
operation to assure sustainability. Partners indicated clearly that without the cooperation within this 
project, it would have achieved only part of its success and have less ability for replication. Part of the 
success was explained by the long history of professional cooperation between two of the 
stakeholders: ACPP and PHG. Furthermore, there was daily contact between the two organizations, 
e.g. between Expatriate and local Coordinators, contact with the Monitoring and Evaluation Expert, 
between PHG‟s field engineers and ACPP‟s Water Expert, and daily contact with the target 
communities. The final report states on this: “These years of close work enjoyed by both organization 
has facilitated the development of a good professional relationship, reflected in the efficiency and 
quality of actions, as both organizations are used to working in the Palestinian context and under the 
restrictions imposed by the Israeli military and authorities” (EC DG-ECHO, 2010, p. 59).  
 
Another important aspect was the support from national level. With the involvement of multiple 
stakeholders, this program was addressed as top priority at the ministers‟ level including the Prime 
Minister office. This project was high on the agenda, not only because it helped a large farming 
community; but more importantly, it contributed to saving some lands which were enclosed behind 
the wall.  
 
(Dis-)continuation of cooperation upon completion 
Sustainability has been addressed through several measures, such as: 
 High quality equipment and spare parts, which are fully available on the Palestinian market and 
can therefore easily be replaced in case of a breakdown; 
 PWA would continue supervision to ensure proper maintenance of the wells by well owners; 
 Well owners were trained and promised technical assistance upon project completion; 
 Well owners, ACCP and PHG signed an agreement with the governors of Qalqiliya and 
Tulkarem, to ensure proper maintenance of the wells and provision of water to the beneficiary 
families. 
 
Interviews indicated that the intention for sustainability was not achieved, despite the plan of 
operation and MoUs. At the end of the project, most of the MSP-members (e.g. Governmental 
Organizations, NGOs, Donors) terminated their direct involvement and assigned the remaining tasks 
for Operation and Management to the level of service provider: the village council or farmers‟ 
cooperative. Subsequently, the service provider concentrated on the service itself: on provision of 
access to water for agricultural purposes. Unfortunately, the village councils and farmers‟ 
cooperatives were not equipped, nor had the means, they said, to consider future sustainability or 
cost recovery, despite the agreements signed. The role of the village councils and farmers‟ cooperative 
in the provision of water further reduced: at the start of the project, farmers themselves elected a 
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service committee (all farmers) to be sure that every farmer received sufficient amounts of water. This 
committee has now effectively taken over the tasks by the village council or farmer cooperatives.  
 
A few MSP members such as NGO‟s (PHG), donor (ECHO) and governmental organizations (PWA, 
MoA, MoH, and the Environmental Quality Authority) decided they would continue to follow the 
project for one or two years to evaluate the success of the project. This, however, proved to be difficult 
as well. Two main constraints led to discontinuation of the MSP‟s after the project. 
 Firstly, there was no budget for the NGOs, donor, or the state institution to follow-up the 
project and find time to continue to meet local stakeholders after completion of the project.  
 Secondly, there was no binding agreement between the MSP‟s and beneficiaries or the service 
provider that could guarantee its duties and services during or after the project.  
 
Contingency measures 
A number of decisions were made as contingency measures in case a military operation would put 
the rehabilitation of wells at risk or in case they received a „stop of works‟ order from the Israeli 
Defense Forces: only one well was rehabilitated at a time and beneficiaries were connected to 
alternative wells during the implementation of the project. Furthermore, a number of security 
measures were taken to reduce risks to the project staff during implementation of the project, such as 
training on security measures, identification cards in English and Hebrew to request assistance to get 
access to the project location; use of logos on project cars. Visibility activities included placing 
notifications and placards at the location of works, but the initial plans for publication in local and 
international media were not followed-through, in order not to risk interruption of the water supply 
to local communities. 
 
3.3 Outputs 
 
Through this project, the MSP was successful in increasing access to water supply for agricultural 
purposes to 6 Communities and agricultural cooperatives. The two wells rehabilitated in Tulkarem 
district are serving primarily the villages An Nazla Ash Sharqiya and Attil; but also benefit nearby 
communities of Kafr Ra‟I and Ya‟bad and other surrounding small villages in Jenin District. 
Furthermore, some nearby Bedouin communities also benefit from improved access to water after 
rehabilitation of these two wells. These are the communities in Khirbet al Mkamel, Khirbet Al 
Hamam, Al Hamdoon, Seida, Zita, and Illar . The two wells in Qalqiliya benefited Azzun, Jayyus, 
Khirbet Sir, Falamaya, Kafr Jammal, Kafr Zibad, Kafr Sur and Kafr Abbush. The project resulted not 
only in rehabilitation of old wells, but also in increased water use efficiency and reduction of 
unaccounted water losses, through maintenance of the pipes and construction of new water nets. 
Furthermore, water losses were prevented by the removal and monitoring of illegal connections. The 
final project report states that the results for result area 1 (access to water for domestic and 
agricultural use) are (EC-ECHO, 2010 p. 40): 
 30,044 beneficiaries (water users, farmers, refugees, Bedouins, local authorities) 
 243 dunums of land has been reclaimed in area C and in the seam zone 
 19,505 addition m3/month of water is available for domestic use 
 37% reduction in operational costs of the wells 
 99.6% reduction of water supply interruptions. 
 The average abstraction capacity of the wells increased from 57.5 m3/hour to 104.8 m3/hour 
 Pumping capacity increased by 82% at point of the well field and 93% at the point farthest 
away from the well 
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 Water consumption of the 14,172 people using the well in Azzun has increased from 78 lpcd 
to 101 lpcd. 
 Water consumption of the 11,828 people using the well in Attil has increased from 69 lpcd to 
90 lpcd 
 Water consumption of the 2,532 people using the well in An Nazla ash Sharqiya has increased 
from 111 lpcd to 137 lpcd.
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Not surprisingly, immediately after the rehabilitation well‟s project, most of the farmers (80% of the 
respondents
45
) said they benefited from the rehabilitation of the wells; 70% said it was a good system; 
and 70% felt that the rehabilitation had increased peoples‟ income; they received enough water to 
irrigate their lands and their crops. Moreover, the quality of water, intended for irrigation, was good 
enough to drink. Other benefits reported (EC-ECHO, 2010), were: 
 Increased pumping capacity facilitates a reduction of working hours; 
 Reduced water supply interruptions (from 142 days in 2009, to 1 day in 2010);  
 Reduction of average operational costs by 28% (initially 1.34 NIS/m3, now 0.97 NIS/m3); 
 Decrease of selling price by 10% (before the project 1.67 NIS/m3; now 1.50 NIS/m3); 
 Increase of total annual revenues with 111% (from 260,434 to 549,040 NIS/year). 
 
For result area 2 (training and capacity building), it reports the following results: More than 47 
farmers from farming cooperatives were trained in „agricultural cooperative management‟ and „water 
management and irrigation‟; and 16 or more well operators and technicians took part in 3 or 4 courses 
(EC ECHO, 2010, p. 49). 
 
3.4 Legitimacy 
 
Whereas the previous sections indicated how the MSP‟s activities have contributed to service 
delivery, two important questions are still not addressed:  
 How does participation in the MSP affect the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions? 
 What are key factors in the (socio-political and institutional) context influencing MSPs, service 
delivery, and their relation with the legitimacy of state institutions?  
 
Due to the fact that the Palestinian Case study was one of the pilot case studies, the legitimacy 
questions have not been addressed as well as in the other case studies; and therefore served also as 
„lesson‟ to the other case studies to address this aspect in much more detail.  
 
General and embedded legitimacy 
The knowledge of the existence of state institutions such as PWA was high in the case study areas.  At 
local level, attention is primarily concentrated around the problems in access to reliable and 
affordable water supply (problem and practice oriented), the high costs of operation of the wells, the 
lack of maintenance resulting in wells to be abandoned. Since there is a wide range of actors involved 
in water supply (municipalities, village councils, water tankers, private sector, Mekorot, regional 
utilities, PWA) there is no expectation that water is to be delivered by state institutions only.  
                                                          
44 The report does not mention the increase of water consumption at the well of Falamya 
45 These are the respondents of the interviews and focus group discussions done for the study on MSPs, service 
delivery and state institutions. 25% of them are primarily farmers; 50% laborers, and 25% were employees. Yet, 
60% of them stated to own farm land behind the wall. 
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The willingness to participate in the activities (such as the needs assessment and training activities) of 
the MSP was relatively high. The organization of activities by the MSP were not clearly separated in 
terms of NGO or state-activities. Moreover, most of the rehabilitation work was done by private 
contractors.  
 
Payment for water from the wells to the well owners (private, municipalities, utilities) seems, as such, 
not a problem, but affordability does. Farmers do not expect necessarily that water is delivered by 
state institutions; water from other actors is equally acceptable. They do expect that the state 
facilitates and regulates. The questions that are relevant to farmers and water users (also for domestic 
use) is not so much who delivers the water supply, but whether it is affordable, reliable (continuous 
supply) and of good quality. Instead of increasing the price of water, the MSP has actually 
contributed to reduced water prices (reduction of 10%) and increased capacities, resulting in higher 
water consumption.  
 
Finally, the extent to which state institutions are seen to operate as accountable and representative is 
not explicitly asked. Informal conversations and personal communication indicate that this is linked 
to PA‟s functioning in general, to its capacities to govern in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
context (or whether it is subservient to Israel), and questions related to corruption.  
 
Process legitimacy 
The pilot study has not produced sufficient information on these indicators. The general impression is 
that the cooperation among state and non-state actors in the MSP is highly appreciated, especially 
amongst members of the MSP, and among beneficiaries – farmers and well-owners. Simultaneously, 
it seems that the protection of beneficiaries land rights has played a crucial role in the motivation for 
this MSP and the state authorities at national level to pursue their objectives and to cooperate well. 
The output reported in the final report to ECHO is quite remarkable. The „protection‟ rationale also 
resulted in a negative side-effect: while some well owners were difficult to trace before the 
rehabilitation, some people suddenly started claiming ownership once the wells were rehabilitated, 
anticipating they could make profits. Some of these cases are still in court. Legitimacy seems therefore 
divided over state legitimacy obtained through politically and strategically inspired state support for 
protection of their lands; and the expectations of individuals on the benefits from participation in this 
scheme.  
 
Performance legitimacy 
Trust in the functioning of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Palestinian Water Authority slowly 
improved when farmers‟ access to water improved. One could therefore say that „legitimacy‟ in this 
situation was related to performance (in terms of substantial improvement of access to, and 
availability of water for agricultural purposes).  
 
Yet, performance and process legitimacy cannot be considered completely in isolation in this project. 
The process of follow-up to the project upon completion (transfer of responsibilities to stakeholders 
who were said to lack the equipment, means and capacity to do something) seriously impacted the 
sustainability of the project and the ability of the well owners to continue to deliver continuous, 
affordable and good quality water. Therefore, the initial satisfaction among the beneficiaries due to 
the improvement of the situation, gradually started to deteriorate again. The statements that the well 
owners, some of which are municipalities, „lack the equipment, capacity and means to guarantee 
sustainability‟ could reflect a lack of trust in the functioning of local authorities, but could also reflect 
an expectation for renewed funding and donor involvement.  
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International legitimacy 
In the context of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, the recognition and legitimacy of state 
institutions (MoA, PWA, MoH
46
) among international actors is unproblematic in their development 
and relief work, even in a situation where the Palestinian State is still not a full member of the UN 
(November 2011).  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The co-existence of practical and strategic interests contributed to the support from national level 
authorities to rehabilitation of irrigation wells in Qalqiliya and Tulkarm. Interests of a practical nature 
(access to water, improvement of farmers‟ livelihoods) were coinciding with strategic interests 
(continuation of cultivation of Palestinian lands between the Green Line and the wall, that were at 
risk of becoming property of the State of Israel). Throughout the project, extensive consultations were 
held, both at local level (with farmers, well-owners) and at national level, with relevant Ministries 
involved. This proved important to create ownership at both local and national level.  
 
Sustainability has been, from the start, a priority among MSP members, and several measures were 
taken to ensure sustainability and to follow the project through for a period after completion, to 
monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the service delivery. The village councils and farmers‟ 
cooperatives were not equipped, nor had the means, they said, to consider future sustainability or 
cost recovery, despite the agreements signed. Also the intention to follow the project through was not 
achieved due to lack of budget for NGOs, donors and state institutions for this purpose, and due to 
lack of binding agreement between MSPs and beneficiaries to guarantee continuation upon 
completion of the project.   
 
Finally, this MSP project shows how potential impacts of the conflict are carefully assessed and were 
integrated in the planning and implementation process by MSP members. Security considerations 
and risks were anticipated at all stages of the well-rehabilitation project in Qalqiliya and Tulkarm. 
This included risks of: (a) not receiving permits in time, (b) a „stop of works‟ order by the Israeli 
Defence Forces, or (c) military operations. Great effort was taken to minimize risks for water users to 
be cut off from water.   
 
The legitimacy of the state institutions is mostly process- and performance-oriented among 
beneficiaries. Among MSP members, the cooperation within the MSP, and priority given to this from 
national level, seems to have increased the appreciation of the involvement of state institutions. 
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4 Case study 2: Zahret Al-finjan Sanitary Landfill  
 
Background of Solid Waste Management 
In Jenin, before the establishment of the Zahret Al-Finjan Sanitary Landfill, the governorate was not 
able to provide waste management. The poor management of the solid waste collection and disposal 
services in Jenin governorate was considered to have a key-impact affecting soil, public health, 
environment, and water resources
47
. In general, poor collection and uncontrolled disposing of solid 
wastes form a threatening pollution source of the public health and the environment through:  
 Deterioration of the environment with high risk for the vegetative cover;  
 Runoff and infiltration of waste water are source of groundwater pollution; 
 Odor and unsightliness of dumpsites discourage tourism and the development of surrounded 
areas.  
 Fumes from burning of hospital waste, household waste and other waste 
 Uncontrolled disposing of wastes has led to social problems among neighbors, incidents of 
explosions and injuries ( social instabilities); 
 Destruction of recyclable wastes 
 
The poor collection and uncontrolled disposing of solid wastes are the result of weak infrastructure, 
lack of institutional capacity coupled with limited enforcement capability and lack of sufficient 
funding. Moreover, the water restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation on the Palestinians 
affected the solid waste management improvement‟s efforts. More than 85 random dump sites were 
allocated in the governorate area. These dumpsites were mainly located adjacent to residential areas. 
The lack of alternatives (waste containers, trash cans, collection of waste) and the restricted mobility 
of people and goods, resulted in the random dump sites. Furthermore, due to poverty and other 
hardships, people did not perceive their environment as priority. The infiltration and runoff of water 
from waste dumps into groundwater was seen as a serious threat to the groundwater. This, and the 
odors, caused environmental and human health problems. As a result, some of the citizens living near 
uncontrolled waste dumps decided to leave their houses and move to other villages. Municipalities 
and village councils then adopted the open-air burning technique to reduce the volume and the odor 
of the solid wastes. 
 
Since the emergence of Palestinian Authority (PA), laws and regulations were enacted to govern the 
work of local authorities to improve the public services in this domain. The Ministry of Local 
Government became the regulator of municipalities and village councils, while the Ministry of 
Environment Affairs takes the responsibility of environmental issues at the national level. In 1998, a 
feasibility study financed by the World Bank was carried out with the objective of developing a solid 
waste management strategy for the West Bank, and priority interventions in the sector (World Bank 
report, 1998). The study identified integrated Solid Waste Management (SWM) projects for Jenin and 
Hebron Districts. 
 
As a result of the political circumstances during the second intifada in 2000, its negative effects on 
socioeconomic conditions, and restrictions on the movement of citizens, the implementation of SWM 
project in Jenin and Hebron was delayed several times. In addition, during the Israeli invasion of the 
governorate (from 2000 to 2004), many containers of the solid wastes were destroyed by the Israeli 
                                                          
47 The price of one cubic meter of water fluctuated between 1NIS in 2000 to 4 NIS in 2010. 
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Defense Forces. In the meantime, the waste accumulated in the streets and created poor 
environmental conditions.  
 
4.1 Characteristics of the MSP 
4.1.1 Initiation and origin of the Zahrat Al Finjan Sanitary Landfill 
The Zahrat Al Finjan project was initiated in 1998 by the World Bank
48
 under the Solid Waste and 
Environmental Management Project (SWEMP) that aimed to implement an environmentally sound 
solid waste management system for the Jenin governorate. The project proposal followed a period of 
emergency rehabilitation by the World Bank of roads, water supply, sewerage, and reconstruction of 
health and education services, which they had started soon after the Oslo Agreements were signed. 
The years preceding the 2nd Intifada were also described as an „optimistic period‟: “the Clinton 
administration was urgently trying to forge a more lasting peace agreement between the Israelis and 
Palestinians. Further, there was talk of building a major industrial estate on the Jenin-Israel border. 
These latter efforts help place the environment and Jenin squarely on the policy agenda” (World 
Bank, 2009, p.1) 
 
The start of the Solid Waste and Environmental Project (SWEMP) in October 2000, almost coincided 
with the start of the 2nd Intifada. Not surprisingly, some international staff decided to leave the 
country. Furthermore, the situation created great reluctance among international contractors and 
consultants to engage in bidding activities. The hostilities that started in September 2000 and rapidly 
gained momentum between September and December, had a major impact on social life, on the 
Palestinian economy, and on the implementation of projects such as SWEMP. During this 
implementation period of SWEMP, the Israeli authorities required constructors to apply for permits 
for the use and transportation of certain types of equipments, which could result in months of delay. 
For the project, it caused delays in preparation and execution of its core landfill component due to the 
closure of Jenin by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), but also because “project offices were shot at, 
waste containers and access roads were damaged, and it was difficult for project staff, consultants 
and the Bank supervision to operate” (World Bank, 2009, p. 5). The damage to the solid waste 
infrastructure in Jenin and Tubas governorates resulting from IDF actions in the West Bank between 
March and May 2002 was estimated at US$ 169,820
49
.  
 
A number changes took place during implementation, in particular “(i) the redesign and operation of 
the landfill to reduce the footprint, reduce costs, increase efficiency, and preserve important site 
features including existing olive trees, and an existing road; (ii) separation of the landfill design from 
construction instead of the original design/build plan; (iii) widening of the geographic scope of the 
project by the Jenin JSC to accept waste delivery from several other municipalities in the Nablus and 
Tulkarem governorates; and (iv) linkage of SW tariffs to prepaid electricity bills in Jenin between 
January and June 2008 resulting in more efficient waste collections” (World Bank, 2009, p. 4).  
 
                                                          
48 One of the questionnaires with one of the MSP members (anonymous), states, however “The idea started 
around the year 1998, the environmental authority with the local monastery came up with the idea to serve 
people in that area”. (translated from Arabic) Other references to this have not been found. 
49 The Donor Support Group performed a „physical and infrastructural damage assessment‟. This included 
estimates of damage to the solid waste system for each governorate in the West Bank (Donor Support 
Group,2002). 
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4.1.2 Objectives 
With this project, the World Bank and its partner organizations aimed at “Implementation of an 
environmentally sound solid waste management system for Jenin District” (World Bank, 2009, p.1). 
This included the following: (a) safe disposal of solid wastes in controlled landfills; (b) environmental 
sound collection and transfer of solid wastes to landfills in Jenin district; (c) stakeholder ownership of 
the project; (d) enhanced implementation capacity within the municipalities to efficiently manage the 
project; (e) and enhanced monitoring and enforcement capacity within the Ministry of Environmental 
Affairs (MEnA). This means that the objectives were not just to improve service delivery directly 
through the construction of a landfill, but that the objectives also included institutional development 
aspects: „institutionalization of cost recovery for SWM services in municipalities and villages of Jenin 
District; regional solutions to solid waste management service provision through the establishment of 
a regional solid waste management council; and use of the environmental law to enforce safe 
collection and proper disposal of municipal solid wastes.” (World Bank, 2009, p. 1-2). This could only 
be achieved, however, through appropriate cooperation between relevant stakeholders.  
 
 
4.1.3 MSP Actors 
International organizations: 
 The World Bank (WB):  In addition to its financial contribution that reaches US$9.5 m, the 
bank performed in the feasibility study (World Bank Report, 1998), the selection of the landfill 
site, and social and an environmental analysis (World Bank Report, 1998). In addition the 
Bank promotes dialogue among authorities and technical specialists on the Palestinian and 
Israeli sides. 
 The European Union (ECHO):  ECHO financed the primary collection in the year 1997,  and 
Disposal of Solid Wastes by many Municipalities and Villages  of about US$3.25 million.  
 
Governmental organizations: 
 Ministry of Local Governorates (MoLG):  MoLG created the Jenin Service Council (JSC) under 
the law of the joint services councils on the year 1997. 
 Ministry of Environmental Affairs (MEnA), later Environmental Quality Authority (EQA):  
MEnA was influential in promoting the passage of the new Environment law in 2000. The law 
affected the project positively by supporting building a land fill in the area.  
 Ministry of Finance (MoF): it played a key role, particularly in ensuring the quick fulfillment 
of effectiveness conditions and in supporting the purchasing of land for the new landfill site.  
 Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR):  PECDAR 
was involved in supplying support to the JSC/PIU for office accommodation, equipment and 
the installation of the financial management systems.   
 
Local governmental organizations: 
 Jenin Service Council (JSC):  The Joint services council was established in the year 2000 by a 
decision from the Ministry of local governments, the council then consisted of 15 
municipalities and 5 village councils.  
 The Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was created by the JSC as an executive branch to 
organize and manage the dump site and other related activities. The JSC and its PIU took 
very strong ownership of and provided strong leadership to the project. They purchased the 
sanitary landfill site with their own funds, funded the landfill operations, and educated the 
local population on the benefits of the project.  
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 The Jenin Governor: helped to mobilize support for landfill participation by other 
governorates, and assisted in problem solving in the implementation phase. 
 
Israeli organizations 
 Israeli Authorities: Despite the negative influence of the Israeli military that caused a delay of 
the construction of the landfill during the 2nd Intifada (by not giving permit to some 
equipment, or by not allowing the material reach the land fill because of the curfews or the 
closer on the checkpoints), the Israeli Authorities contributed to the selection of the landfill 
site, and participated in the discussion of the technical issues.  
 
Private sector 
 Contractors: the landfill construction, the rehabilitation, and closing of uncontrolled dumpsites, 
were all executed by the private sector. The haulage of waste from Nablus is also done by private 
contractors.  
 
Furthermore, a number of experts were hired during the project, including: the (a) project 
coordinator; (b) public awareness expert; (c) information and database expert; (d) financial 
accountant; (e) environmental information expert; (f) an environment monitoring consultant, and (g) 
a solid waste management expert. Except for the awareness expert and the Israeli Solid Waste 
Management Expert, all others were hired by the governmental organizations.  
 
 
4.1.4 Activities and approach 
The activities under this project included (a) the design and construction of a controlled landfill in 
Jenin District; the rehabilitation / closure of uncontrolled dumps; (b) the improvement in SWM 
services (collection, haulage and disposal of solid wastes) by Municipalities and Villages of Jenin 
District; provision of equipment; (c) the building of institutional capacity in the newly created Joint 
Services Council for regional SWM services, capacity building of municipalities of SWM, 
strengthening of the institutional and monitoring capacity of Ministry of Environmental Affairs and 
pilot recycling projects.  
 
The responsibilities for implementing these three components were distributed: the first two 
components were the responsibility of the Joint Service Council (JSC), while the implementation of 
component (c) was the responsibility of the Joint Service Council and the Ministry of Environmental 
Affairs (MEnA)
50
.  
 
The project is located in Zahrat Al Finjan region, approximately 17 km southwest of Jenin city. The 
landfill‟s present capacity allows to hold 2.9 million m3 waste, arranged in four cells. The first two can 
be filled with waste for an estimated 7.5 – 10 years, after which the other 2 cells have similar filling 
capacity. The entire landfill site occupies 2,400,000 m2, with approximately 185,000 - 240,000 m2  
currently in use
51
. After the landfill construction was completed in June 2007, other municipalities 
from Nablus and Tulkarem governorates asked to deliver their wastes to the landfill, which increased 
the beneficiaries to approximately 800,000 of inhabitants. The capacity of the landfill was estimated to 
be 2.25 million tons, which serve the northern governorates for 15 years as a first phase. 
                                                          
50 MEnA is later refered to as Environmental Quality Authority (EQA) and by some also referred to as the 
Palestinian Environmental Authority (PEA) 
51 The report from the World Bank, 2009 states 185,000 m2, while the information from PHG is (in 2011) 240,000 
m2 
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Figure2: Zahret Al-finjan land fill location (Joint Service Council, 2003) 
 
 
4.1.5 Funding 
The funding (US$ 14 million) was divided amongst the EU, the World Bank and the Palestinian 
Authorities.  
 
 Design and 
construction 
Collection, 
Haulage and 
Disposal of SW 
Capacity 
Building 
Amount (US$) 
World Bank x  x 9.5m (68%) 
EU  x  3.25m (23%) 
Palestinian 
Authorities 
x x x 1,25m (9%) 
 
Source: World Bank, 2009, p. 352 
 
The Joint Service Council was responsible for implementation of the first two components (worth 9m 
US$), and the JSC together with the Ministry of Environmental Affairs were responsible for the 
capacity building component. 
 
Zahrat Al Finjan is considered as one of the most successful multi-stakeholder projects in the West 
Bank. The problems of solid wastes in the governorate encouraged all actors to be in a process of 
dialogue and concerted action towards effective solutions for solid waste collection and disposing 
services. This MSP involves different types of actors having a strong interest in solid waste 
management. International, national, and local representatives acted together at the different phases 
                                                          
52 For a summary of original and actual components and costs, see World Bank, 2009, p. 3-4 
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of the project. Despite the fact that the project is a Palestinian driven project, the Israeli authorities 
were involved in the process partly to take critical stands for groundwater aquifers consequences and 
partly to evade the harmful impact of air pollution from burning Palestinian waste and the possible 
spread of pests on nearby Jewish settlements and Israeli border towns such as Afula city, Ha Emek 
city, and Migdal city.  
 
4.2 Governance of the MSP 
 
Preparation phase 
In the preparation phase, the World Bank participated in discussions with the Ministry of Local 
Government (MoLG), the Environmental Quality Authority (EQA), the Local Government Units 
(LGUs) in Jenin governorate, and community groups, as well as with Israeli environmental and 
military authorities. Similarly, they communicated closely with other donors that were active in the 
solid waste sector, in particular the European Union, Germany, Japan and Italy. (World Bank, 2009, p. 
4). Including them early on in the discussions, helped mobilizing necessary resources (financial and 
technical) later on. The World Bank formed an on-the-ground supervision support team, that played 
an important role, not only in communication and dialogue with the JSC and the EQA, but also in the 
continuous communication with the Israeli military and civilian authorities, even during the 2nd 
Intifada. 
 
During the preparation and the implementation period of the project all stakeholders were 
intensively involved in the MSP. In the initial phase, several studies and workshops were conducted 
(technical, social and environmental) which served not only the purpose of data collection and 
exploring the technical, legal, environmental and social dimensions of the problems related to Solid 
Waste Management, but also had a beneficiary and lasting side-effect: it helped to (a) establish the 
feasibility of the project; (b) disseminate knowledge; and (c) build consensus and promote dialogue 
among authorities and technical specialists on both the Palestinian and Israeli side (World Bank, 2009, 
p. 16).  
 
Decision-making and Implementation 
The organizations directly responsible for the implementation of the project were the Joint Service 
Council (and its Project Implementation Unit) and the MEnA/EQA. The establishment of a Joint 
Service Council was decided upon, based on earlier experiences from other initiatives in Gaza and 
other Bank-supported projects. The Joint Service Council incorporates 20 municipalities and village 
councils and at present, 56 member communities. Its management board consists of 20 people, and 
their task is to “oversee the waste collection and disposal service and to “decide on major and 
operational and strategic issues including waste service tariffs” (World Bank, 2009, p. 25). The 
decision-making structure is a remarkable one: it does not benefit larger municipalities over smaller 
municipalities. Between its establishment on 24 July 2000 and December 2009, at least 83 meetings 
were reported of JSC members at the level of Municipal or village mayors (World Bank, 2009, p. 43), 
meetings took place almost monthly. 
 
A Beneficiary Assessment of the Zahret Al-Finjan Landfill Project indicates that decision-making is, 
consistently, based on anonymous voting and majority rule, which has resulted to an increased trust 
and commitment within the JSC. It states that, as a result, the local governments “have a high level of 
cooperation and coordination than ever before, such opportunity of being at the same table give them 
the chance to discuss wide range of issues beyond SWM. Sharing ideas and experiences and common 
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interests became true between these parties” (World Bank, 2009, p. 43). Moreover, “the apparent 
absence of a dominant member of groupings has permitted a relatively swift decision-making process 
and general unity between communities to accept higher tariffs in turn for improved solid waste 
services” (World Bank, 2009, p. 24). 
 
The three Ministries (MoLG, MoF and EQA) played an instrumental and facilitating role, both during 
preparation and implementation. The Ministry of Local Government initiated the establishment of a 
Joint Service Council. While PECDAR provided support in terms of office accommodation, 
equipment and installation of a financial management system; MoF supported the JSC in acquisition 
of land, in accommodating requests to reallocate funds when this was considered necessary for the 
achievement of objectives from the project. The Minister of Finance showed that it had high priority, 
through a number of site visits. 
 
The EQA was supposed to supervise the project from the beginning to the end by enhancing the 
appropriate cooperation between the World Bank, the EU, and JSC. Lack of the experience and 
communication hampered a leading role by the EQA, however, and the World Bank on-the-ground 
Support Unit therefore took more control of the project than the EQA. The movement of the EQA‟s 
financial department to Gaza constrained coordination and disrupted work within the EQA. The 
EQA was successful in promoting the new Environment law in 2000.  
Information and communication 
A number of workshops and surveys, both before and after the project, served to collect necessary 
information. Communication between the stakeholders was mostly done in the regular meetings, 
both by the JSC and between the JSC, PIU and the ministries. Communication with the Israeli civilian 
and military authorities was consistently and effectively done by the World Bank on-the-ground 
support unit. This aspect has been emphasized, also as „lesson learned‟ for future projects. 
 
The Israeli Environmental Authorities were reported by MSP members to be quite helpful and tried to 
advice the Palestinians in this project. Their interest was to keep the groundwater clean in that area, 
as it was close to Israeli settlements that rely on the groundwater which may otherwise be polluted by 
inadequate waste management. The report suggests that the cooperation by the Israeli Authorities 
(both civil and military) may have been greatly facilitated by a decision from the JSC to hire an Israeli 
Solid Waste Management Expert for redesign of the landfill and supervision of the construction. This 
was confirmed during the last meeting in Ramallah. The consultant was hired by Hydroplan, a 
German consultancy firm, whose original design of the landfill was rejected
53
.  
 
Communication with beneficiaries 
The final project report on the Zahrat Al Finjan Landfill emphasized the relevance of open channels of 
communication with beneficiaries, as well as the possibility to issue complaints and the commitment 
to look into these. The Project Implementation Unit has indicated that, upon complaints of some 
citizens about noxious odors, they investigated this, and found that these were not caused by the 
landfill. (it is unclear is whether or not these complainants were satisfied). The need to be responsive 
to complaints, is acknowledged by the JSC as way to improve service quality,. Even more, the 
                                                          
53 Several factors resulted in this rejection: “The initial design by the international landfill consultant (Hydroplan 
of Germany) contracted under the project was too costly, used more land than necessary; required the closure of 
the existing access road; interrupted a historic railway track; and required the construction of culverts under the 
landfill as well as the construction of 2 dams”. (World Bank, 2009, p. 67, note xii). 
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suggestion is provided that local municipal management and service delivery, in general, has 
somewhat improved due to the visibility of efficient solutions by the JSC in the solid waste sector. 
 
Completion 
After the completion of the project, most of these organizations followed up the workflow through 
the JSC and PIU. Currently, the Zahrat Al Finjan landfill is operated by the Project Implementation 
Unit (PIU) under the supervision of the JSC. The operation and management processes of landfill and 
collection services are also followed up by the different actors from the state institutions, donors, and 
the Israeli authority to ensure the effectiveness of the project. The respondents to the interviews 
indicated that – in case of potential conflicts and disagreements among the MSP members – they 
could ask advice from the Ministry of Local Governments (MoLG). The landfill receives daily about 
400 tons of domestic wastes from Jenin, Tubas, Nablus, and some villages from Tulkarem 
governorate. The number of beneficiaries increased from 200,000 (initially assumption in 2000) to 
600,000 in 2009 by the acceptance of solid waste from additional towns and municipalities. At present 
(in 2011), the estimated number of beneficiaries is approximately 800,000 people.   
 
Continuation and Financial sustainability  
The revenue collection takes place at two levels: (a) from citizens (approximately 15 NIS/month54); 
and (b) from municipalities. Revenue collection from citizens has improved in particular in those 
municipalities that combine the solid waste collection fees with the electricity bills. The initial 
assumptions regarding revenues and expenditures were adjusted during the 2009 mission based on 
the data from 2008. The new data indicated that total benefits over the 15 year period would reach 
US$ 41.8 million (instead of the initial estimate of US$ 38 million), while total costs would reach US$ 
30.7 million (compared to the initial US$ 32 million). The data also indicated that the JSC has built-up 
a strong cash surplus (U$ 677,000 by 2008), and achieved a 77% recovery rate of payments from 
municipalities by 2008. This is expected to increase to 90% recovery rate in the fourth year of 
operation. The report refers to „intensive peer pressure‟ amongst municipalities that resulted in this 
high recovery rate. Tariffs are negotiated with each municipality, and based on a combination of 
factors, such as the costs of collection, transport distance to the landfill, transfer costs and disposal 
costs. This varied between US$ 7.2/ton and 26.7/ton Some municipalities undertake their own 
collection and haulage and therefore only pay a „gate fee‟ of around 8US$ / ton of waste. Several 
other municipalities negotiated a lump-sum payment per month. (World Bank, 2009, p. 27-28). The 
financial sustainability seems therefore guaranteed, even with a 10% rise of costs and when the 
collection efficiency declines by 10%.  
 
Two particular developments are worth mentioning. First, the establishment of an emergency fund 
(US$ 0.5m). The Ministry of Finance asked, in December 2002, for adjustment of the Legal Agreement 
to facilitate “damage repair and emergency service support activities/…./ with a view to 
rehabilitating damaged physical and institutional infrastructure, and mitigating the decline in 
essential public service provision, including, electricity, water, waste water, solid waste and social 
services” (World Bank, 2009, p. 3). Second, in 2007, when the landfill was completed, the 
municipalities in the Nablus, Tulkarem and Qalqiliya requested to use the services from the landfill, 
which doubled the delivery of waste to the landfill, almost tripled the number of beneficiaries (from 
200,000 to 600,000) and reduced the need to increase tariffs. The increase in revenues received 
contributed to the financial robustness.  
 
                                                          
54 15 NIS equals 3 Euros (exchange rate November 2011). 
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4.3 Output 
The accomplishments of the MSP have been quite successful. Almost all project objectives were 
considered to be satisfied: 
1. Environmentally sound disposal of solid waste through: 
a. Construction of a new and technically well-designed landfill; of 185,000 m2, with a total 
size of 2,400,000 m2 to allow for future extensions.  
b. Operations at the new landfill were reported to be effective; 
c. Successful closure and rehabilitation of 85 unregulated dump sites; 
d. 600,000 people served by landfill (2008); estimated 800,000 by 2011; 
e. The landfill and its operation complies with international environmental standards 
2. Improved quality of collection and transfer services 
a. Improved collection and delivery of new equipment; 
b. Implementation of plan for improved services; 
c. All new equipment is maintained and operational;  
d. At least 200,000 people are served by the improvements (600,000 in reality) 
3. Strengthened institutions and capacity to manage solid waste in Jenin District 
a. 50 people trained at EQA and JSC; 
b. 200,000 people reached by public awareness; 
c. International supervision contract for the new landfill; 
d. Quarterly JSC council meetings (almost monthly). 
e. The Project Implementation Unit has qualified staff and sound management systems. 
4. Sound and sustainable solid waste management system for Jenin District 
a. Maintenance of US$ 50,000 landfill account; 
b. Reports on baseline information and financial improvement; 
c. New tariff structure and increased revenue collection efficiency;   
d. Increase tariffs to NIS 15 / household/month 
 
Among these achievements, it was especially the environmental monitoring that was reported to be 
weak, as recognized by all stakeholders. This was partly related to the restrictions on the movement 
of goods and people, and EQA‟s location in Gaza; but the World Bank report also indicates a 
mismatch in expectations and cooperation between the EQA and the PA: “The role of EQA as an 
effective and knowledgeable regulator is hampered by an absence from the Palestinian Authority of 
an environmental permitting system for landfill operations or standards on maximum permissible 
concentrations of waste contaminants in the ground or surface waters. EQA do not believe that they 
are sufficiently empowered to take a lead in this matter without a backing of regulations from the 
central administration” (World Bank, 2009, p. 34).
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The components that needed further improvement (World Bank 2009) were: 
 Environmental monitoring and regular inspections; 
 Availability of sufficient vehicles, equipment and tools to facilitate inspections; 
 Public awareness of solid waste issues and the landfill; 
 Standardized system for responsiveness to complaints; 
 Continuous attention for broader social development issues. 
 
                                                          
55 It is unclear whether rivalry between the PA in the West Bank and Hamas administration in Gaza have 
affected the difficult cooperation between the EQA in Gaza and the PA in the West Bank. 
55 
 
The various stakeholders realize, also, that several risks remain, in particular in the context of conflict 
between Israel and Palestine, even though the Israeli Authorities have been supportive of the 
construction and operations of the landfill. It is not only the risk of intra-Palestinian and intra-
municipal rivalries that could negatively affect the operations and sustainability. The security 
situation during and after the intifada put considerable constraints on the stakeholders and delayed 
the process as well.  
 
4.4 Legitimacy 
 
 
General and embedded legitimacy 
The respondents that were interviewed were aware of the construction of the landfill, the existence of 
the Joint Service Council (referred to under different names) and improvement of services. Only one 
respondent mentioned to be aware of the cooperation between the JSC and the Ministries, while 
others were not aware that state institutions at national level had been involved. When we assume 
that legitimacy from beneficiaries for state institutions requires visibility and awareness that these 
institutions have been involved, a general lack of such awareness also means that – even when 
performance is perceived to be quite satisfactory – there is no, or very low, impact on the state‟s 
legitimacy from beneficiaries.  
 
Yet, at the same time, the willingness to pay for the, (generally perceived improvement) of solid waste 
management is reported to be exceptionally good (given data on previous willingness to pay). The 
final report states a 89% support among the 106 interviewed beneficiaries for the Solid Waste Tariff 
(World Bank, 2009, annex 5: Beneficiary Assessment, p. 39). The willingness to work with and 
through these state institutions among other MSP members is directly related to the process and 
perceived performance of specific institutions (eg. EQA). The extent to which state institutions are 
seen as accountable and representative is discussed in the general discussions, since this applies to all 
cases.  
 
Process legitimacy: 
One of the lessons that were emphasized in the project‟s final report, was to seek – as much as 
possible - cooperation with and information from local professionals, who have local, situational 
knowledge. Cooperation with non-state actors is not seen as a threat, but as an opportunity.  
 
The interview reports and the final report both indicate the swift follow-up from the JSC56 to 
problems in general. Problems within the MSP were largely prevented by the decision-making 
structure preventing larger municipalities to dominate the decision-making process; by the 
professionalism and commitment from the PIU leader. When problems could not be solved by the 
JSC itself, they could ask support from the Ministry of Local Government, or the Ministry of Finance. 
In problem situations, the leaders tried to seek for common interests, such as the hiring of the Israeli 
consultant. This probably created more goodwill and trust on the Israeli side, thereby facilitating 
cooperation from the Israeli environmental authorities. Early participation and dialogue among MSP 
members, community groups and Israeli military and environmental authorities has been extensive 
and seems to have been very effective. 
 
                                                          
56 The Joint Service Council can be seen as an MSP in itself, with a membership of municipalities. 
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The process-related expectations (decision-making in a cooperative environment) were met among 
members of the MSP. The changes in governance procedures by the MSP included the closing of 
uncontrolled dumpsites; taking direct measures in case of dumping of waste at unregulated waste 
dumps; and the responsiveness to complaints from beneficiaries. The final report states that “The 
closing is supported by 97% of the persons interviewed and 71% maintained that the project has 
contributed to ending or reducing the open burning of solid waste” (World Bank, 2009, p. 38). 
 
When looking at the protection of beneficiary rights, it is important to note that a social safeguard 
policy was applied, but involuntary resettlement was not required. Landowners of land that was 
required for construction of the landfill received compensation, and were quite satisfied with this 
compensation, according to the Beneficiary Assessment (World Bank, 2009, p. 6). Another issue was 
the protection of the informal waste-pickers: 50 waste pickers were affected by the project. The 10 full-
time waste pickers were all offered a job in the Solid Waste Management Sector. Eight of them 
accepted this opportunity, while 2 declined. The project report does not refer to any compensation for 
the other informal waste-pickers. 
 
Cooperation between municipalities was perceived to be very good by MSP members. The 
Beneficiary Assessment refers to increased levels of trust and cooperation at the LGU [Local 
Government Unit] level (World Bank, 2009, p. 38). 
 
Based on these positive findings, the MSP, in particular the JSC and PIU, seem to have made an 
important advance in creating more ownership and changing attitudes towards Solid Waste 
Management. Still, the picture from the beneficiaries themselves was mixed. From the interviewees of 
the Beneficiary Assessment, only 31% knew about the project, mostly those living nearby the site of 
the landfill. The collection of Solid Waste was seen to have improved among 62% of the respondents 
from the Beneficiary Assessment. It is particularly among leaders of municipalities that high 
confidence in the current waste collection and services exists.  
 
Performance legitimacy 
Performance legitimacy has increased among MSP members, in particular the leaders from 
Municipalities and Village Councils; more communities want to join in, seeing the positive results of 
the JSC. The JSC is considered an example for other areas: “The success of the Jenin JSC has 
encouraged the PA, in particular the MoLG and EQA, to establish similar JSC‟s in other 
governorates” such as those in Bethlehem and Hebron, to manage waste generated in these 
governorates. Besides geographic replication, it is also considered to be introduced in other sectors. 
The JSC has received a lot of recognition, not only by municipalities and communities, but also by 
political leaders. This suggests an increased legitimacy of JSC‟s for Solid Waste Management. 
 
International legitimacy 
The national and international stakeholders (World Bank, European Union) were recognized to have 
played an important role in getting cooperation from Israel for the construction of the landfill and for 
their support in maintaining good relations with the Israeli authorities. The JSC and PIU were held in 
high regard among the World Bank staff. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The governance dimension is, in the case of the landfill, strongly bound by the context of the conflict, 
the location of land in area C and the Seam Zone, and by the formal procedures of permits from 
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Israel. One of the key factors that initially affected the start of the project was the beginning of the 2nd 
Intifada. This was not anticipated in the risk analysis. Despite this, the MSP has been quite successful 
in terms of process and cooperation between MSP members (horizontal and vertical). While part of 
the success can be attributed to the leadership (the project coordinator, management board and the 
World Bank on-ground support staff), another important factor was the decision-making structure, 
standardizing a anonymous voting procedure with a majority rule. The continuous dialogue between 
the donor organization (World Bank) and the Israeli military and environmental authorities, and the 
unexpected decision from the JSC to hire an Israeli consultant for the redesign of the landfill, also 
contributed to the acceptance of the construction and operation of the landfill. Finally, the support 
from the relevant Ministries greatly facilitated the work of the MSP and the success of the project. The 
only indicator for legitimacy (of the services) among beneficiaries is the extraordinary willingness to 
pay (see also context analysis for a comparison). This however, cannot be directly translated to 
legitimacy of the state authorities.  
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5. Case study 3: Kharas waste water treatment plant 
 
Kharas village
57
 is located in the western part of Hebron District in the south of the West Bank, 
approximately 11 km north-west of Hebron City. It has a population of approximately 6,600 people
58
. 
Before the 2nd Intifada, most (male) villagers used to work as construction workers inside Israel. With 
the 2nd Intifada, many of them lost their jobs in Israel, and they started working as farmer. This 
contributed to a situation in which a high percentage is „economically inactive‟: in 2009, only 28.7% of 
the labor force (defined as age 10 and above) were economically active, while 71.3% were not
59
.  
 
The occupation played a major role to instable the political situation in the area, especially after the 
second intifada. The village lost approximately 2000 dunums of land to Israel, that used a large part of 
this for construction of the wall that is planned to pass through the western part of Kharas village. 
The political situation has, however, improved the socio-economic situation in Kharas village over the 
last couple of years. At present, according to the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), “nearly 
50% of the active town labor force is again engaged in the Israeli labor market” (ARIJ, 2009, p. 9). 15% 
percent of the economically active labor force depends on agriculture, 15% on trade, 10% works in the 
industry; 8% as employee, and 2% in the service sector. (ARIJ, 2009, p. 9 and 12). Only 25% of the 
population has completed secondary or higher education (ARIJ, 2009). 
 
The social structure of Kharas village reflects relations within and between families. Kharas Town 
Profile indicates that “The population of Kharas is comprised of six main families, several smaller 
families, and a few refugees, such as the Al Hrub family, Kdemat family, Attwan family, Halahlih 
family, Aqabneh family, Abu Aljarish family.” (ARIJ, 2009, p.7). This social structure has been said to 
have some impacts on the functioning of the village council in terms of problem solving, on their 
capacity for revenue collection; on the process of getting support for the implementation of the waste 
water treatment plant, and, thereby, on the effectiveness of the MSP.  
 
5.1 Characteristics of the MSP 
 
5.1.1 Initiation and origin of the waste water treatment plant 
The village faced a number of problems directly related to water, such as: (a) pollution of the 
groundwater through seepage of septic tanks (USAID, 2003); (b) shortage of drinking water; and (c) 
lacking of water for irrigation. Before 2002/2003, most people relied on cesspits for waste water 
disposal. These cesspits were not sealed, resulting in infiltration of sewage through the soil in the 
groundwater. Additionally, the problem of overflowing cesspits created public health risks to their 
immediate environment, the water network and water storage facilities. The costs for removing a 6 m3 
                                                          
57 For a fact sheet on Kharas, see http://vprofile.arij.org/hebron/pdfs/Kharas%20Town.pdf accessed 9 
September 2011 
58 6,595 for 2003 based on estimates from the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics (Sha‟ar, Kelly and Kleinau, 
2003, p. 63) , and 6,655 based on the PCBS survey of 2007 (Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian Central 
Bureau for Statistics, 2009, table 11). http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/census2007/ind_loca_09.pdf  
59 Based on the 2007 Census, ARIJ found that the “The labor force in Kharas town is 4,526 people in total, of 
which 28.7% are economically active, and 85.8% of the economically active people are employed. The remaining 
71.3% of the labor force population represent non-economically active people”. (ARIJ, 2009, p. 10). The non-
economically active people are mostly pupils, students and housekeepers. 
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load from the cesspit
60
 ranges between 100 – 300 NIS (25-75 US$); the average annual costs of 
emptying cesspits in southern West Bank thereby adds up to 400 US$ per household. In Kharas 
village, the average frequency of cesspit emptying is reported to be 12 times/year. The frequency is 
determined by “geological formation, water consumption and waste water generation rates and 
methods of construction of the cesspits” (EHP, 2002, p. 9). In other communities, cesspits are less 
frequently emptied. The removed content is often openly disposed of at roadsides, on agricultural 
land, or in wadis, thereby polluting the groundwater, creating a threat to public health (EHP, 2002, p. 
14). Some people avoid paying for removal by emptying their cesspits on the streets.  
 
The waste water treatment plant project was as a response from the Palestinian Hydrology Group 
(PHG) to local community needs: many citizens were worried that their drinking wells might be 
affected by the cesspits. The first activities included a survey among the community. This was 
followed by an Environmental Impact Assessment and site selection by the Palestinian Ministry of 
Environmental Affairs. This was then followed by the purchase of the land selected and construction 
of the treatment facility.  
 
Currently, the surrounding environment of the treatment facility is a growing residential area. The 
fact that people start the construction of new houses near the treatment facility suggests that a 
minimum of environmental nuisance caused by the treatment facility is acceptable to local people. 
The initial site selection process did not foresee these changes in land use. Many farmers start selling 
their farming land that is close to the WWTP to be used as urban land. Initially, a dirt road was 
opened to access the treatment facility at the project execution time, now it is transformed into a 
broad-paved road linking the village with the other villages.  
 
5.1.2 Objectives 
The intervention described here is part of the larger Village Service Program that was implemented 
and completed in 2003. The objectives of the treatment facilities in Kharas village were to: 
 “improve the hygienic conditions; 
 Protect water quality; 
 Reduce pollution loads and 
 Demonstrate a village with sound collection and treatment of waste water that could enhance 
surrounding villages to carry out such projects in their areas.”  (Awadallah; abu-Sharkh; and al-
Rabi, 2007, p.4). 
 
In 2007, PHG and Kharas municipality
61
 wrote a proposal for extension of the Kharas Waste Water 
Treatment Plant (WWTP), allowing another 140 houses to be connected to the existing treatment 
plant. The proposal states: “The treatment plant capacity is tolerant to receive these new sewage flows 
without being overloaded and this is important” (PHG-Municipality, 2007, p. 2). The goals related to 
this extension are: 
 “Creating job opportunities for those suffering from unemployment and poverty conditions; 
                                                          
60 Average quantity of removed content per cesspit is 5m3. 
61 The terms „municipality‟, „municipal council‟, and „village council‟ are used intermittently by respondents.  
From 1972 onwards, Kharas village was managed by a village council. In 2000, their tasks were taken over by a 
municipal council, appointed by the Palestinian Authority. This historic path explains the use of multiple names. 
“The municipal council operations and responsibilities include: (1) Administration, planning and development, 
organizing and issuing building licenses; and (2) Infrastructural maintenance of water, electricity, solid waste 
collection, open and paved roads and the distribution of social services.” (Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem, 
2009, p.5)” 
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 Replacing the existing sanitation systems (leach pits) at new areas in the village by 
environmentally sound sanitary alternatives; and 
 Extension of the sewer lines to serve more population.”(PHG - municipality, 2007, p.2).  
 
The objectives are similar to the objectives of the first phase, with an addition of (a) improving 
drinking water quality; (b) improving public health by suppressing disease vectors; (c) improving 
income; and (d) protection, conserving and improving the environment
62
.  
 
5.1.3 MSP Actors 
The multiple stakeholders that participated in this initiative were: 
 
Local organizations: 
 Inhabitants of Kharas village  
 Land owner of the treatment facility site and the neighboring land (a private owner). 
 Farmers of the Kharas village area.  
 People/landowners/local councils of the area's downstream villages (i.e Hatta community) 
 
Governmental organizations: 
 Ministry of Agriculture (MoA); Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), Ministry of Local 
Governance (MoLG); Ministry of Health (MoH), Environmental Quality Authority (EQA) 
(licensing panel and monitoring) 
 The Village Council / Municipality (the owner of the project and the operational authority) 
 
Non Governmental organizations: 
 Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), that played an important role in the design and 
implementation of the project together with other stakeholders. 
 Other NGO's: Farmers Union, Palestinian Agricultural Relief Community (PARC)  
 
International organizations: 
 Donors: United States Agency for International Development (USAID)  
 Partner implementing agency: Save the Children Federation (SCF),  
 ANERA, American Near East Refugee Aid  
 
 
5.1.4 Activities and approach 
The Village Service Program (VSP) of 2003 had 4 components which were implemented not only in 
Kharas village but also in the nearby towns of Tarqomya, Beit-Ula, Hatta and Nuba:  
1. Water, including improvements to (a) the water supply network in Kharas; (b) a storm water 
culvert in Kharas, and (c) a water reservoir in Tarqomya; 
2. Wastewater and sanitation, including (a) a sewer system and waste water treatment plant for 
Nuba, and (b) a sewer system and waste water treatment plant for Kharas; 
3. Capacity building for municipal staff; 
                                                          
62 It seems that this proposal has not been implemented yet, due to lack of funding. Kharas village did receive 
other funds for the sewage network from USAID under the Emergency Water and Sanitation Program (EWAS): 
on May 30, 2007, USAID approved a project for the extension of the sewage network (160,000 US$) under the 
Emergency Water and Sanitation Program (EWAS). However, the physical condition of the WWTP during a field 
visit from the researchers in 2010 (not operational, in dire need of renovation) suggests that these funds were 
used to extend another part of the sewage network in Kharas village.  
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4. Public Awareness activities (PHG, 2003). 
 
The information below only refers to the component of the waste water treatment plant in Kharas 
Village (2b). This project included 5 km of sewer lines and connections to 100 houses
63
 (connected at 
different dates after paying fees) linked to a treatment plant. The waste water treatment plant area 
covers 1 dunum and consists of the following: 
 Screening using a bar screen followed by a grit and sand removal channel. 
 Primary treatment using high rate anaerobic treatment by up-flow anaerobic sludge 
blanket (UASB) tank equipped with a sludge withdrawal pump and a gas collection and 
flare facility. This system is the first of such technology installed in the country. 
 Wetlands for secondary treatment 
 Sludge treatment using sludge drying beds 
 Effluent storage tank equipped with a pump to allow reuse options 
 A perforated underground sewer pipe allowing infiltration of the treated effluent in case 
reuse is not available. 
 
The project was among the first waste water treatment plants implemented in the southern part of the 
West Bank for rural areas, and was innovative in that it collects sewage and treats it on a village level 
rather than on a household level.  It introduced a low-cost and efficient technology 
64
for treatment of 
sewage. Additionally, in the proposal phase, stakeholders aimed at the reuse of treated effluents as an 
expected outcome.  
 
The project produced about 100 CM/d treated effluent, which – under the right conditions - could 
have been used to irrigate 200 dunums65 over the year under variable irrigation schedules. This 
would have reduced stress on fresh water sources while also contributing to public health, income, 
reduce poverty and maintain food security. This component has, in spite of all efforts, not been 
achieved by the MSP, due to resistance against cultivation of crops with treated waste water and the 
price of such water (over non-treated water)66. 
  
5.1.5 Funding 
The project in Kharas village was financed by USAID and the local village council (facultative 
contribution of 50%). A total of US$ 120,000 was spent in different items implementation for the 
collection and the treatment system construction. Save the Children was the implementing 
organization of the project and they followed the project from the start to the end of phase one. 70,000 
US$ went to PHG for implementation of activities; 50,000 US$ to the village council. The expenditure 
included the purchase of land, equipment, pipelines, payments to the contractor, the organization of a 
needs assessment, workshops and training courses. Kharas municipality relied and still relies on 
donors for funding; it did not have enough funds for such a project, even though the municipality 
                                                          
63 One can find some inconsistency among the reports about the number of houses and population served (either 
100, 200, or 200-300); the length of the pipelines (2 km, versus 5km) and the contribution of PHG (60,000 US$ 
versus 70,000US$). The information on the capacity ranges from 100 to 120 CM/day,  
64 A low-cost system is preferred for communities with populations of less than 5,000. For communities with a 
population size of more than 5000 (such as Kharas village), PWA prefers a conventional system for waste water 
collection and treatment, instead of stand-alone systems. However, the WWTP provided only services to 200 
houses (with an estimated population of 2000). 
65 1 dunum is 0.1 hectare or 1000 square meters 
66 Farmers claim, in general, that consumers do not accept products which have been cultivated with treated 
waste water (a cultural perception). For more information, see section 5.4 
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collected revenues (10NIS/month) for maintenance of the WWTP. Unfortunately, the willingness to 
pay for fees is reported to be low, resulting in revenues that are too low for proper operation and 
maintenance. As a result, the WWTP is not working at the moment, as it needs repairs and 
maintenance
67
.  
 
According to the Water Sector Strategic Planning Study (PWA, 1999), “rehabilitation of all the existing 
overloaded treatment plants should be a priority, followed by the necessary rehabilitation of all 
sewage schemes” (EHP, 2002, p. 12). This is again confirmed in the most recent report identifying 
Basic Needs and Development of Ongoing and Proposed Projects by Governorates  (PWA, 2009). 
Kharas (Kharras) village is identified by PWA as one of the villages in need of extension of the waste 
water network (PWA, 2009, p. 157)
68
.  
 
5.2 MSP Governance 
A lack of communication between and within the governmental institutions mentioned above, led to 
the situation that the Palestinian Environmental Authority played a very weak role in this case study. 
Poor communication between its employees affected the project, and especially made it more difficult 
for the NGO‟s and the donor to continue the work. The Village Wastewater System Feasibility Report for 
the West Hebron and South Nablus Clusters Final Report (EHP, 2002) already emphasizes the importance 
of communication, through the engagement of local officials, organization of introductory public 
meetings, community based design and construction. It also emphasizes the importance of good 
financial management, in particular revenue collection to cover costs of operation and maintenance.  
 
These aspects have not received sufficient attention according to the projects‟ final report. 
Furthermore, the assumption that „community based design and construction‟ will result in a faster 
and easier process, is not necessarily correct: 
 
“Site selection was done in cooperation with the local council and many constraints arose to the 
surface. This because land availability and welling to sell the land was limited. Three alternative sites 
were selected during our joint filed visits with the local council. The first and second alternatives were 
altered because the village council spent 1.5 year of negotiation with landowners without a result. The 
third alternative was the only choice where land purchasing was possible…..”(PHG, undated, par. 
2.2.1). 
 
Additionally, it was difficult to get agreement within the community on the construction plans: 
“during construction, several people refuse the project and oppose it. In fact they sent messages to 
different ministries and did their best to stop the project. Therefore, we implemented several 
discussion and workshop sessions with the local people. We found that the people who incited the 
others to oppose the project are moving from their hateful feeling against some people in the village 
council, not from technical points of view” (PHG, undated, par. 2.2.1). 
 
While none of the reports refers to further details of how the MSP itself was governed, it is clear that 
the implementing organizations faced major challenges in terms of (a) available management capacity 
                                                          
67 This is in line with some of the findings of a 2002 report (EHP, 2002), where the root causes of inadequate 
sanitation for the West Hebron and South Nablus Clusters are identified to be „insufficient recurrent revenues 
and poor management‟. 
68 The large majority of ongoing and proposed projects as identified in this report are funded by international 
organizations (donor organizations), or still „in need of funding‟.  
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and skills at the level of the municipal council, (b) communication with and within governmental 
organizations; and (c) in terms of revenue collection at local level. The social structure and features 
referred to in the introduction, have had some impact on the management capacity, problem solving 
and revenue connection.  
 
The Final Report on the Village Service Program (PHG, undated) indicates that the management and 
capacity of the Village Council has been quite challenging. Payments to the contractor by the Village 
Council were delayed, and trust from NGOs in the performance of the Village Council was rather 
limited. Due to management problems of projects and problems in the village, the village council was 
replaced (PHG Final Report)
69
. This is confirmed by the Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem, that 
states that: “In 2005, a new council was elected, consisting of 11 members and 15 employees.” 
(Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem, 2009, p.5). Since 2004, more than 12 projects were 
implemented in Kharas village, mostly infrastructural projects (water, roads, electricity, buildings). 
This reflects a higher degree of willingness of other organizations to cooperate with the new village 
council, although some MSP members emphasized that capacity problems continued to exist. Despite 
these and other reported difficulties, PHG reports in 2009 that the “Kharas municipality has 
demonstrated good capacity in the management and servicing of the existing treatment plant, as well 
as collecting monthly servicing tariffs for the sewage system” (PHG, 2009). 
 
5.3 Outputs 
Outputs of the waste water treatment project in Kharas by (members of) the MSP were: (a) an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA); (b) construction of a waste water treatment system and (c) 
connection of 200 houses, allowing future expansion. At the time of the interviews
70
 in 2010, 
approximately 40% of the buildings (houses, schools, commercial and public buildings) were 
connected to the sewage network or treatment plant.  
 
Additionally, the Village Service Program (including the Kharas Waste water Treatment Plant project) 
had output that benefited all target sites (Tarqomiya, Kharas, Beit-Ula, Nuba and Hatta): 
 Capacity building for municipal staff: 
 
Course Number 
of days 
Number of 
participants 
Carried out by: 
tariffs and cost-recovery in water 
and sanitation 
5 15 PWA and Jerusalem Water 
Undertaking (JWU) 
Planning and implementation of 
water and sanitation projects 
4 14 CEC – Palestine Polytechnic 
University 
Water Resource Management 5 16 Water Research Institute 
O&M of Water Networks 10 ? JWU, Ramallah 
Basic computer skills for software 10 ? Hebron Net 
 
 Public awareness, through material on treatment and distribution of water; lectures and training 
for women on how to use water sustainable at household level, how to improve public health 
and how to limit pollution. (Awadallah, 2003) 
                                                          
69 It is important to note that, for the purpose of this (MSP) case study, the village council itself was not consulted 
with regards to these problems. It is quite likely that members of the village council have another perspective. 
70 12 people from Kharas village were interviewed, within age range of 35 -65 years. Average family size of 9. 
25% farmers, 50% laborers, 25% employees; and focus group discussion with another 10 people. 
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The capacity building and public awareness component is thus carried out by a variety of 
stakeholders, some academic (CEC and PPU), others NGOs (Water Research Institute; Hebron Net), 
governmental (PWA) or private (JWU). These were not part of the MSP, except PWA.  
 
During the first 7 years of operation, the treatment facility proved to be efficient and a good sanitary 
solution. The water quality was reported to be in line with the Jordanian standards, while effluent 
water was considered to be suitable for discharge to streams or ground water and reusable for 
irrigation (PHG, undated). The overall efficiency of the removal of pollutants is: 
 
Parameter 
71
 In Out % Removal 
Primary stage 
COD (mg/l) 1200 360 70% 
BOD (mg/l) 546 120 78% 
Kj-N (mg/l) 80 60 25% 
Secondary stage 
COD (mg/l) 360 <100 72% 
BOD (mg/l) 120 <20 83% 
Kj-N (mg/l) 60  <15 75% 
Overall 
COD (mg/l) 1200 <100 92% 
BOD (mg/l) 546 <20 96% 
Kj-N (mg/l) 80 <15 81% 
Source: PHG, undated.  
 
After the first years of operation, the facilities deteriorated. At the time of our visit in 2010, the 
treatment plant was not in use. Several proposals have been formulated for rehabilitation of the waste 
water treatment plant and for extension of the sewage network since 2007.  
 
The establishment of the treatment plant, and services related to it were seen as very positive by the 
respondents from the interviews and focus group discussions, even though the treatment plant was 
not functional at the time. The treatment plant saved the people who were connected from high costs 
of emptying their cesspits (ranging from 150 – 1200 NIS/year); it was seen to improve the hygienic 
conditions by suppressing pollution. Yet, 16.7% had not seen changes. The treatment plant was seen 
as good alternative for cesspits, and the large majority (83.3 – 91.7%) considered it was a priority and 
necessary to extend the sewers and treatment plant to cover the entire village. The interviews also 
give a good picture of the willingness to reuse treated effluent in irrigation: 33.3% of those with arable 
land did not agree to reuse it in irrigation, while 66.7% did agree. 50% of the respondents agree that it 
can be applied, provided that people are made aware of the benefits; 25% it can be applied anyway, 
also without awareness raising activities. Only 16.7% does not agree with reuse in irrigation at all. 
The production of fodder with treated water is more acceptable (31.3%) than the production of 
seedlings (25%), the production of seeds  (12.5%), to irrigate fruit trees (12.5%) and irrigation of 
                                                          
71 BOD refers to the biochemical oxygen demand; COD is chemical oxygen demand. “COD is often measured as 
a rapid indicator of organic pollutant in water. It is normally measured in both municipal and industrial 
wastewater treatment plants and gives an indication of the efficiency of the treatment process. COD is measured 
on both influent and effluent water. The efficiency of the treatment process is normally expressed as COD 
Removal, measured as a percentage of the organic matter purified during the cycle” 
(http://www.hannainst.com.au/Pro/what_is_cod.htm accessed 9 september 2011). 
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vegetables in greenhouses (6.2%). 45.5% would not eat fruits that are irrigated with treated effluent 
water, but 54.5% would. Finally, all respondents were in favor of financial and technical support to 
farmers to use treated effluent water. While this can be seen as a achievement of the awareness raising 
by the MSP, it also points to an important change in one of the key factors of the cultural context 
(acceptance of treated waste water) that has hindered the implementation of cultivation with treated 
waste water sofar. 
 
5.4 Legitimacy 
Whereas the previous sections indicated how the MSP‟s activities have contributed to service 
delivery, another important questions is still not addressed: How does participation in the MSP affect 
the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions? 
 
General and embedded legitimacy 
Since the willingness to pay, and the difficulties in enforcement were presented as a major issue, 
additional attention was paid to this in the questionnaires and focus group discussions. This provided 
supplementary information on the willingness to pay, the way in which fees should be composed, 
and the affordability of the services. 9.1% of the respondents expected the connection to their house, 
and the services, to be for free. The exact same percentage of respondents indicated not to pay their 
electricity bills and water bills regularly. One can expect quite a bit of overlap between those two 
groups, but how much is unclear, as the interviews were anonymous.  
 
However, 54.5% of the respondents agreed to both (a) a fee for connection to the house, and (b) a 
monthly fee for Operation and Maintenance. 27.3% expected only a monthly fee, while 9.1% agreed to 
the connection fee, but not a monthly service fee for Operation and Maintenance. 16.7% found 0 
NIS/month affordable; 75% of the respondents indicated to find 15 NIS/month affordable and 8.3% 
found 25 NIS/month an affordable amount for O&M. In Half of the respondents (50%) indicated they 
expected the service to be stopped for households not paying their fees; while 8.33 % expected 
continuation of the service, and another 8.33% agreed to not pay any of the fees. 33.3% indicated not 
to agree with people who refused to pay. Interesting enough, some of the respondents who have been 
connected stated that they saved quite a lot of money, by not having to empty the cesspits anymore. 
One respondent stated he/she saved 300 NIS/month. The information from the questionnaire shows 
an annual average of 483 NIS/year, but with a large differentiation, ranging from 150 NIS/year to 
1200 NIS/year. Limited willingness to pay is not restricted to the services provided by the village 
council; some households also avoid payment to firms by emptying the cesspit themselves in the 
streets, greatly contributing to the problems of bad odor, pollution and public health. 
 
The willingness to pay for these services should be seen in the historic context of the Palestinian 
Territories and its state institutions. Since the Palestinians were prohibited to have their sovereign 
state institutions, their basic needs to health care, water, and education were – for long – taken up by 
non-state actors or by citizens‟ own efforts. This situation is reported to have created a culture of 
individualism in which individuals secure their needs by themselves, without taking into 
consideration the effect of others.  
 
Were state institutions operating as representative and accountable? The evidence for this is very 
limited. Some comments were made regarding the lack of accountability (at municipal level) and poor 
communication within and between governmental organizations (national level). These were, 
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however, issued by members of the MSP, not by beneficiaries
72
. This, again, reflects to legitimacy 
concerns among MSP members.  
 
Process legitimacy 
Process-related complaints were mostly issued by members of the MSP itself. These complaints relate 
mostly to problems in communication between institutions, and with the citizens. The 
communication among state-actors (national level), and between state and non-state actors was 
reported to be poor. Some of this may be explained by the position of a large NGO (PHG) vis-à-vis 
state institutions that struggle with limited resources.  
 
Beneficiaries were unanimous in their wish to have the sewage network extended to the entire village; 
whether or not this was done by governmental organizations or through cooperation between 
institutions seems less important. None of the respondents referred to cooperation between 
institutions. 
 
Even though village councils are elected, social structures of the community still have an impact on 
the effectiveness of these councils. During an interview with the mayor of Kharas village it was 
stressed that the enforcement of revenue collection in Kharas village was very problematic, due to 
family and other social relationships. One could argue that the revenue collection is hampered by the 
historically developed „rights‟ of family members who are expected to help each other. This is, 
however, not supported by the large majority of the respondents. The rights of the original 
landowners were ensured by purchasing land from the landowners for a good price. 
 
Performance legitimacy 
The positive perception of the waste water treatment plant (during the years of operation) has not 
resulted in a perceived change of legitimacy of governmental organizations; not at local level, nor at 
national level. It is the performance itself which is appreciated, even to the extent that it should be 
expanded to cover the entire village.  The interesting conclusion is therefore that, while beneficiaries 
expect little from the state due to the historic context in which they have to take care of these 
problems themselves, they do appreciate when the underlying problems are addressed by 
(cooperation between) institutions. This supports the assumption that legitimacy is more functionally 
than institutionally located. 
 
International legitimacy 
The role of international actors in this initiative is hardly addressed, except for the appreciation for 
the „good support from Save the Children‟. The legitimacy of state institutions among international 
actors is not clear.   
 
5.5 Conclusions  
While none of the reports consulted for this case study refers to further details of how the MSP itself 
was governed, it is clear that the implementing organizations faced major challenges in terms of (a) 
available management capacity and skills at the level of the municipal council, (b) communication 
with and within governmental organizations; and (c) in terms of revenue collection at local level. The 
                                                          
72 The questionnaire did not address this; it merely addressed the sewage connection, villagers‟ 
satisfaction regarding the WWTP, willingness to pay and perceptions regarding reuse of treated 
effluent water. 
67 
 
social structure and features referred to in the introduction, have had some impact on the 
management capacity, problem solving and revenue connection. The village council was unable to 
break through patterns of disputes between and within families. As a result, the decision-making 
process was delayed.  
 
The cooperation between MSP members (Village council, Governmental Organizations at national 
level; PHG) seems to be strongly affected by internal problems in individual organizations (limited 
capacity, skills, lack of communication, divisions). This situation further deteriorated due to 
communication problems, resulting in limited trust between organizations, again affecting 
cooperation. One could therefore say it is a reiterative process. While service delivery initially 
improved and was greatly appreciated, the waste water treatment plant stopped operating due to 
insufficient revenues and maintenance. The relation with legitimacy of „state institutions‟ is anecdotal, 
at best. The election of a new village council in 2005 seems more related to accountability and 
governance-aspects (performance-based and process-based legitimacy), than to legitimacy of the 
village council itself (general and embedded legitimacy).  
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6.  Case study 4: Desalination Plant and Water Campaign Al Bureij 
camp 
 
The information on this case study is very limited, due to the situation as described in Chapter 1 of 
this report. Some information is therefore collected from internet sources, instead of interviews. There 
is, unfortunately, no information in any of the sources on what happened exactly and how the MSP 
members responded when funds were suspended in 2007. Nor is there information on, whether, who 
and how the MSP (or its members) succeeded in getting ECHO‟s approval to refund the project in 
2008. 
 
Political  and economic situation   
In January 2006, Palestinian parliamentary elections were won by Hamas. This resulted in internal 
political violence between Fatah and Hamas, culminating in numerous deaths. In March 2006, Hamas 
began setting up its government, which was followed by international sanctions. As a result of the 
internal fighting, international sanctions and lack of experience, public services were severely 
weakened. On 25 June 2006, an Israeli soldier was kidnapped, and from June 28, IDF undertook 
several raids on Gaza. At the same time rockets were regularly fired from Gaza into Israel. Although 
Fatah and Hamas formed a unity government in March 2007, Hamas took control over Gaza in June 
2007. They took over the government offices and replaced Fatah officials. This was followed by a 
blockade of goods and people by Israel, and by suspension of aid by most donors (the United States, 
the European Union, several European countries and the Arab states).  
 
The Israeli blockade included an import ban on most construction materials, raw materials and spare 
parts; strong restrictions on the import of consumer goods and fuels,  bans on the movement of 
people, and denial of access to agricultural land
73
 close to the border
74
. In addition, fisheries are 
severely hampered due to Israel‟s restrictions on the area where fishing is allowed: this was restricted 
from 20
75
 to 12 miles in 2002, to 6 nautical miles in April 2006, and further reduced to 3 nautical miles 
at the end of 2008 (OCHA-oPT, jan. 2011). The security situation further deteriorated with Operation 
Cast Lead, between December 2008 and January 2009.  
 
The boycott on Gaza Strip made economic life more difficult. The unemployment percentage rose up 
to 80 percent, with poverty and aid dependency reaching more than 80 percent in Gaza Strip. The 
closure also had a major impact on the water sector of Gaza, in terms of:  
 Shortage of energy and fuel, resulting in frequent interruptions of electricity and lack of fuel for 
power generators. This affects, in particular, the operation of pumping stations for wells. 
 Shortage of spare parts which are required for maintenance and repair of water infrastructure, 
water wells and pumping stations. 
 Subsidence of the private sector, threatening the continuation of contract works for water 
projects. Lack of raw material and construction materials resulted in discontinuation or closure of 
businesses; 
 Price increase of construction materials, such as cement, that have resulted in closure of some 
projects before completion. 
 
                                                          
73 Est. 35% of Gaza‟s agricultural land (OCHA-oPT, 2011) 
74 With no go zones up to 500 m from the borders and high risk zones from 500 – 1500m 
75 Fishermen were allowed to catch fish as far as 20 nautical miles off the coast in the Oslo agreements  
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The Operation Cast Lead of December 2008/January 2009 resulted in damage of water and waste 
water infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, with an estimated cost of 6 Million US$ (CMWU, 2009).  
 
In june 2010, Israel softened the closure, by allowing in more consumer goods. Although this resulted 
in a doubling of the average weekly truckloads of goods during the first half year, this the continued 
ban on construction materials results in continued pressure on the water infrastructure. 
 
6.1 Characteristics of the MSP 
 
6.1.1 Initiation and origin  
Al Bureij camp is a refugee camp located in the middle of the Gaza Strip, in the governorate Deir al 
Balah. According to UNRWA, the refugee population of Bureij area is currently more than 31,000
76
. 
An assessment of the situation for the water services in 2006 revealed the high concentration of saline 
water. Based on this assessment, the EU (ECHO) agreed to fund a small treatment desalination plant 
for the municipal water service, to be attached with the pumping system for the citizens of Al-Bureij 
area.  
 
6.1.2 Objectives 
The activities targeting Al Bureij camp were conducted in the framework of the project „Improving 
living condition for the most vulnerable people of the oPT granting access to safe and sufficient water‟ 
(ECHO/-ME/BUD/2008/01009) by ECHO. It has been implemented by Terre des Hommes (Italy), 
together with Gruppo di Volontariato Civile (GVC) and the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG).  
The project aimed to improve sustainable access to safe-drinking water for Al-Bureij refugee camp by: 
 “Investigate drinking water contamination and to identify potential sources of contamination 
during the tankered water production and delivery process” (GVC, PHG, 2009, p. 3).  
 Improving the water quality to Al Bureij refugee camp, through a Reverse Osmosis Brackish 
Water Desalination Plant (RO-BWDP) to Al Bureij refugee camp.  
 
The immediate objectives of the drinking water monitoring campaigns were: 
 Investigating the quality of drinking water provided by private vendors at the source (private 
desalination units), during transportation (water tankers), at the community level (distribution 
points), and finally, at the household level (storage systems); 
 Comparing a refugee-camp area (Al Bureij and Nusseirat) with a border area (Wadi As Salqa) 
where drinking water habits differ and unmonitored and unregistered private agricultural wells 
are often used as sources of drinking water;  
 Identifying specific hygiene habits and general circumstances tied to each sample in order to help 
determine both possible causes of contamination and strategies to lessen contaminating factors” 
(GVC, PHG, 2009, p.3) 
 
 
6.1.3 MSP Actors 
The main stakeholders were: 
 
 
                                                          
76 The Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics indicates a total population of 24,007 in Al Bureij refugee camp, and 
another 1552 households with a population of 9848 in Bureij area itself (PCBS, census 2007) 
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Community Based Organizations: 
 A community-based local water committee that was responsible for awareness raising about 
safe hygiene practices 
 
National Governmental Institutes 
 Palestinian Water Authority (PWA); 
 
Local Governmental Institutes and Regional semi-public entities 
 Municipality of Bureij  
 Coastal Municipal Water Utility (CMWU)
77
; 
 Gaza Electrical distribution Company (GEDCo)
78
 
 
Donors: 
 EU ECHO 
 
Implementing agencies  
 Groppo Volenterinto Civile  GVC; 
 Terra des Hommes TdH - Italy; 
 Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) as a local partner  
 
It is important mentioning that during the course of this project, the individual members of 
stakeholder-organizations changed, such as the Municipality Council of Bureij in July 2007 (PCHR, 
2008), the transfer from the „old‟ to the „new‟ PWA; and the local water committee.  
 
 
6.1.4 Activities and Approach 
In December 2006 GVC began implementing the project in partnership with PHG. The original project 
was, however, suspended after the Hamas take-over of power in Gaza Strip, and the Israeli blockade 
on import of goods and construction materials in 2007. GVC was only able to complete the water 
carrier line (see below), but the plans for the desalination plant had to be suspended (Liveleak, May 
2009). In 2008, the project was re-funded by ECHO. The two main activities were: a water quality 
campaign and construction of a desalination plant.  
 
The first objective (see previous section) was operationalized through the formulation and 
implementation of a water quality monitoring campaign of the water provided by the municipal 
network, as well as the drinking water provided by private vendors in Al Bureij and Al Nusseirat 
Refugee camp. The drinking water campaigns involved water samples taken in the Al Bureij and 
Nusseirat refugee camps, from various sources: (a) water wells, (b) network distribution nodes, (c) 
                                                          
77 “The Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) is a semi-public entity, financially independent, 
responsible for the water supply services, wastewater treatment and disposal and storm water collection. CMWU 
is a consolidation of the Water Services of 25 Municipalities of Gaza Governorates. CMWU is the main service 
provider for all water and wastewater services throughout all Gaza strip governorates” (Shaker, undated, p.1). 
78 “Gaza Electricity Distribution Co. limited (GEDCo) was established in 1998, its owned by the Palestinian 
National Authority , represented by the Palestinian Energy and Natural Resources Authority , the ministry of 
finance , Gaza Governorate municipalities and the local councils. GEDCo is in operation to distribute the 
electrical energy to all the areas under the control of the Palestinian National Authority, the responsibilities of 
GEDCo are collecting of the electricity monthly bill, technical supervision, maintenance work and improvement 
of the supplying system of the low voltage (0.4 KV) and the medium voltage network 22 KV” (www.gedco.ps) . 
72 
 
taps and (d) roof storage tanks. (GVC and PHG, 2009, p.3). This also included awareness raising 
activities (follow-up) through visits at household level, in particularly for those families whose 
storage tanks had high levels of contamination. These visits were done by GVC and PHG staff, 
supported by CBOs. According to the Narrative Report by GVC&PHG (2009), chemical and 
microbiological tests were conducted by the Public Health Laboratory of the Ministry of Health 
(PHL)”. (GVC&PHG, 2009, p. 4). The second objective was achieved through a desalination plant
79
, 
funded by ECHO, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid department: 
 “Rehabilitation and upgrading of the S72 municipal well in Al Bureij Camp and installation 
of a desalination plant to provide 22.000 persons with potable water 
 Construction of a reservoir to blend the permeate water produced by the plant with the water 
produced by two other wells serving Al Bureij Camp 
 Closing of two highly contaminated wells and construction of a water carrier line connecting 
the two wells of Al-Moghraga, in order to provide drinking water to about 30,000 refugees of 
Nusseirat Camp; 
 Provision of Operation and Maintenance training for the water supply system” (Liveleak, 
May 2009) 
 
The restrictions on import of construction materials also affected the project after 2008: not only did 
the GVC have to abandon the construction of a reservoir due to lack of cement, but it also required 
adjustment of the construction material for the tank that blends the treated water from the municipal 
well (after establishment of the desalination unit) and water from two other wells serving Al Bureij 
camp. 
 
6.1.5 Funding 
After the initial delay and implementation problems due to the volatile political situation in 2006 and 
2007, the project was re-funded in 2008 by ECHO, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid 
Department, and implemented by Terre des Hommes in Italy, in partnership with the Italian 
Cooperation (Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo-Ministero degli Affari Esteri), Gruppo di 
Volontariato Civile (GVC), and the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG).  
 
The grant for the first project: „Improving living condition for the most vulnerable people of the oPT 
granting access to safe and sufficient water‟ (ECHO/-ME/BUD/2008/01009) by ECHO was 909.798 
US$ (OCHA, 2008)
80
. This includes, however, also activities, for other municipalities and refugee 
camps. ECHO funded (a) the supply of the Reverse Osmosis Brackish Water Desalination Plant to Al 
Bureij refugee camp and (b) the water quality monitoring of  water provided by the municipal 
network and private vendors in Al Bureij and (part of) Al Nusseirat refugee camps. OCHA-HRF 
funded the campaign that targeted the remaining areas of Al Nusseirat refugee camp and the rural 
area of Wadi As Salqa. (GVC, PHG, 2009, p. 3).  
 
                                                          
79 N.B. The initial report (see 6.1.a) refers to a „small desalination unit‟ to be attached to a pumping system for the 
citizens of Al-Bureij area, yet without project or reference numbers. We assume that the information from 
Liveleak refers to this desalination plant as it has the same funding agency, same implementing agencies, same 
year, type of activity and municipality. 
80 The EU overview of Agreements for 2008 states an amount of 585,000 Euro, granted to Terre des Hommes – 
Italy for this project (ECHO, 2008). This is a bit less than 909,798 US$, based on historic currency rates of 
December 2008. It is unclear whether the difference is based on currency fluctuations in 2008, or whether an 
additional amount was granted to another MSP member. 
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6.2 MSP Governance 
 
Since the establishment of Hamas government in Gaza, a transfer took place from the „old office‟ 
under the PA administration and the „new office‟ under Hamas administration. A lack of 
communication, and tension, between the old and new state institutions led to the situation in which 
the Palestinian Water Authority under the Palestinian National Authority (PA) played only a limited 
role in this case study.  
 
Personal communication with staff members from the Environmental Quality Authority and the 
Palestinian Hydrology Group indicates that – while salaries were temporarily halted after Hamas 
took government authority
81
 - after some time, payment of salaries for the PWA-staff (from PA) was 
resumed, under the condition that they would not resume their responsibilities, not come to the 
office, or take data and information with them, in order to allow the new office to function. This 
transition was extremely challenging for NGO‟s and donors that tried to continue their work.  
 
Communication and cooperation 
Furthermore, communication and cooperation between both PWA and the Coastal Municipal Water 
Utility (CMWU) and the Al-Bureij municipality worsened from 2007 onwards. The Al-Bureij 
municipality council was replaced on 18 July 2007. Similarly, the community-based local water 
committee that was first established in 2006, was very fragile due to the internal conflict in June 2007. 
Therefore, a new local committee was established in 2007. It was selected from all blocks of the served 
area, representing different views to give the service provider of water and sanitation a complete 
picture. According to one of the MSP members, re-establishment did not bring about smooth 
cooperation within the local water committee: „the seeds of conflict were inside this committee‟ 
(personal communication).  
 
Clearance  
One of the challenges for the MSP was to get clearance for importing the tank, spare parts and 
chemicals. Due to the perseverance of the Non-Governmental Organizations and the support given 
by ECHO, the PWA (Palestinian Water Authority), and the CMWU (Costal Municipalities Water 
Utility), the plant finally entered Gaza in February 26. 
 
6.3 Output 
The system
82
 of water treatment is reported to be “operational and works for 23 hours a day 
providing from 90 to 135 m3/h of potable water /…/ to about 22.000 refugees of Al Bureij Camp”  
(Liveleaks, 2009). Information from SKYPE meetings with PHG in Gaza, however, indicated that the 
blending of treated water with water from two other wells, results in a water quality that has 
                                                          
81 A country brief on the West Bank and Gaza, from the World Bank states: “Salary payments to about 160,000 
civil servants were suspended by early March [2006], and later only partially covered through the EU‟s 
Temporary International Mechanism (EU TIM) [1] and bilateral donor funds, both of which bypassed the PA 
through the Office of the President, or direct funding. The formation of a Unity Government by Hamas and Fatah 
on March 17, 2007 only marginally improved the situation. Despite donor efforts, a protracted freeze in salaries 
combined with the incarceration by Israeli forces of 46 members of the PLC brought to a virtual halt of the 
Palestinian policymaking and service delivery.” (World Bank, 2011). 
82 The system combines (a) a desalination plant that treats water from the S72 municipal well and (b) a tank 
which blends the permeate water with water from the two other wells serving the Al Bureij Camp. 
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somewhat improved (compared to the pre-treatment phase), but is not perceived to be of sufficient 
drinking water quality by the beneficiaries, who therefore tend to use the water for domestic 
purposes (washing, sanitation, cooking, cleaning). 
 
Through the water quality monitoring program, potential sources and points of contamination were 
identified and specific awareness activities about safe hygiene practices have been conducted 
involving community-based Local Water Committees. General findings were that bacteriological 
contamination is the result of unsafe storage methods, and transport (water tankers), although the 
storage system at household and community level are the most significant sources of contamination. 
Faecial contamination was found mostly in drinking water stored in containers inside the house, and 
rarely in roof top storage tanks. 
 
A detailed overview of findings can be found in GVC, PHG, 2009.  One of the remarkable findings 
was that consumers are generally attracted to water with a low or even ultra-low mineral content 
(calcium and magnesium), which is provided by private suppliers. This could result in long-term 
health problems, such as osteoporosis and ischemic heart disease, or a loss of fluoride in the bone 
system. Another finding, not less important, was that, at the time of the Water quality Monitoring 
Campaign, „Standards and procedures for private desalination units, tankers, and distribution points 
are not applied in Gaza. Water desalination and drinking water processes are not regulated‟ (GVC, 
PHG, 2009, p. 15).  
 
The project also focused on strengthening the dialogue between the community and the institutions 
in charge of the water supply service, with the aim of ensuring a more equitable distribution of 
water.” (Liveleak, May 2009). There is no information whether this has been achieved. The references 
to communication problems and tensions arising from the transition from the PA to the Hamas 
government seem to indicate the opposite. 
 
ECHO Desalination Plant Al-Bureij Gaza Strip.   
Source: Presentation Catherine Libert, 2010. 
 
6.4 Legitimacy 
A major complicating factor in the cooperation between multiple stakeholders and in the process of 
implementation, has been the struggle within and between governmental authorities in a situation of 
transition, and the recognition these actors receive (or not) from international actors and from each 
other. The legitimacy across organizations (stakeholders), seems to be strongly related to individual 
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and institutional capacities, as well as the extent to which organizations allow political affiliation to 
play a role, e.g. in the recruitment of their staff and achievement of objectives.  
 
The unclear situation during the transition has been, and still is, complicating the implementation of 
projects. This transition affected – as far as we know - the Local water Committee, the Municipality 
Council of Al Bureij and the replacement of staff at PWA in Gaza. A change in the composition in 
terms of the main political affiliation of partner organizations was stated to have affected the trust-
relations between the stakeholders involved.  
 
Due to the practical difficulties in connecting with Gaza for the purpose of this study, it has not been 
possible to assess the type of legitimacy of state organizations (such as PWA), local governmental 
organizations (municipal council) or semi-public institutes (CMWU) among the beneficiaries of the 
project in Al-Bureij. This is unfortunate, because it would be interesting to know how much the 
transition from a PA administration to the Hamas Government has changed citizens‟ perspectives on 
its effectiveness and legitimacy. 
 
6.5  Conclusions 
The final question was: „What are key factors in the (socio-political & institutional) context influencing 
MSPs, service delivery, and their relation with the legitimacy of state institutions?‟  
 
Key factors in the social context are the high poverty rate, the high unemployment in Gaza Strip and 
the high percentage of the population which is dependent on aid (80%). Not only is the population 
aid-dependent, but also the organizations involved in the water sector are aid dependent. The most 
important economic context factor that affected service delivery in the water sector was – and still is - 
the Israeli boycott on the import of goods, in particular construction materials, equipment, fuel and 
energy.  
 
The most important non-economic context factor that affected service delivery in the water sector has 
been Israel‟s military operation Cast Lead, which resulted in great damage to the water and sanitation 
infrastructure (estimated 6million US$). 
 
The political context factor that most prominently influenced both service delivery and MSP 
effectiveness was the transition from the PA administration to the Hamas administration, with some 
parallel institutional structures still in place. It is, in particular, the discussion and questions regarding 
the legality and affiliation of PWA that had an impact on PWA as legitimate counterpart organization 
for donor organizations. The legitimacy of the local authorities (Municipal Council of Bureij) has been 
contested as well (Palestinian Center for Human Rights, 2009).  
 
Trust and communication between MSP members with the Council were said to have deteriorated 
since replacement of the Council in 2007. The tensions and fighting within and between institutions 
also resulted in weak communication. Our definition of legitimacy under beneficiaries should 
therefore be extended to the legitimacy among other relevant organizations. However, most of all, it 
was the security situation and transition to the Hamas government in 2007 that caused withdrawal of 
donor funds. This resulted in a 2-3 year delay in the implementation of the project that was first 
initiated in 2006.  
 
76 
 
References 
 
CMWU, January 2009. Damage Assessment Report. ‘Water and Waste Water Infrastructure and Facilities’. Gaza; 27 Dec. 
2008 – 19 Jan. 2009. Coastal Municipalities Water Utility. 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/opt_wash_cmwu_Water_Wastewater_Infra_Damage_jan_2009.pdf 
accessed 14 September 2011. 
 
EU, ECHO. 2008. Agreements for Humanitarian Aid awarded in 2008 by ECHO.  
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/agreements/agreements_2008.pdf accessed 14 September 2011. 
 
Gruppo di Volontariato Civile (GVC); Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG). October 2009. Water Quality 
Monitoring Campaigns Middle Area of the Gaza Strip. In coordination with Coastal Municipalities Water Utility 
(CMWU) and Palestinian Water Authority (PWA). Narrative Report.  
 
Libert, C. 2010. Humanitarian Aid from the European Commission in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPT). Catherine 
Libert, Directorate-General ECHO/A3. Presentation 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/documents/presentations/presentation_07_07_2010_en.pdf accessed 
12 September 2011. 
 
Liveleak, May 2009. Palestinian Water Authority works with Italian NGO to make up for decades of exploitation. 
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=e5d_1243467986&comments=1 accessed 13 september 2011. 
 
OCHA-oPT. January 2011. The humanitarian impact of the blockade and „Cast Lead‟ Israeli Offensive on Gaza. 
Humanitarian Overview. UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
 
OCHA-oPT. 2008. Financial Tracking Service. Tracking Global Humanitarian Aid Flows. Other humanitarian 
funding to occupied Palestinian territory 2008. Table H. List of commitments/contributions and pledges to 
projects not listed in the Appeal Report. Compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by donors and 
appealing organizations. http://www.reliefweb.int/fts (table ref. R4) accessed 14 September 2011 
 
PCHR. 2008. PCHR Opposes Anti-Democratic Council Appointments Policy in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian Center 
for Human Rights, 8 June 2008.  
http://www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=926:pchr-opposes-
anti-democratic-council-appointments-policy-in-the-gaza-strip&catid=133:press-releases-from-other-years-05-
08&Itemid=300 accessed 14 september 2011. 
 
Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), March 2011. Brief Report on the Palestinian Water Sector Reform Program. 
Ramallah, Palestine. 
 
Shaker, undated, est. 2010. CMWU adaptation in water supply projects during the Israeli closure situation. S.l. 
http://www.cmwu.ps/files/reports/8-6-2011-%5Breport%5D-Ahmad_Shaker_Paper.pdf accessed 14 September 
2011. 
 
UNRWA. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. 2011. Bureij Refugee Camp. See: 
http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=79 accessed 13 September 2011. 
 
World Bank, 2011. West Bank and Gaza Country Brief.  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/WESTBANKGAZAEXTN/0,,cont
entMDK:20149751~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:294365,00.html accessed 14 september 2011. 
77 
 
7 General Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Although the research focused on 4 particular initiatives, stakeholders at the mid-term and validation 
meetings for this research called for an initiative that would extend the current study to national level, 
and to initiate discussion at national level about a country‟s economic and social priorities, what 
water will be needed to meet those priorities, and which challenges need to be addressed to deliver 
water. Stakeholders argued that this outcome will not emerge naturally from existing market 
dynamics alone, but will require a concerted effort by all stakeholders, the willingness to adopt an 
integrated water resource management view and the courage to initiate and fund water sector 
reforms. 
 
Key sub-questions that were discussed in previous case studies, were: 
1. Which actors and trends can be identified in service delivery in the studied context? 
2. What are the characteristics of the multi-stakeholder process organized for service delivery? 
3. How is this process governed? 
4. What are the outputs in terms of service delivery? 
5. How does participation in the MSP affect the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions? 
6. What are key factors in the (socio-political & institutional) context influencing MSPs, service 
delivery, and their relation with the legitimacy of state institutions?  
 
7.1 Case study contexts 
The case study context for the 4 Palestinian cases have been described in detail in Chapter 2. This 
showed that developments in the political context (most particularly: the 2nd Intifada, the Oslo 
agreements, the construction of the Wall, and the expansion of settlements) have shaped and 
reshaped the context in which Palestinian governmental organizations operate. Further development 
of the water and waste sector is hampered by the tense relation and cooperation between Israel and 
Palestine, and by the division of the West Bank in Area A, B and C. This context factor also affects the 
legitimacy of Palestinian state organizations at national level; while limited capacity and failures in 
service delivery is recognized and acknowledged, the tense relation with Israel also offers them a 
legitimate excuse for (at least part of) these failures.  
 
Three important observations can be made in relation to the debate on fragility: first, the Palestinian 
state, not having all powers of a state, has no long-term tradition in providing services. These have 
been provided in the past (before the Oslo Agreements) by Israeli civil and military authorities, and to 
some extent by Mekorot, the Israeli largest national water supplier. Service delivery in the WaSH 
sector can therefore not seen in isolation from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, since the Palestinian 
water sector is dependent on its Israeli counterpart (Israeli Water Authorities) and the civilian 
administration.  
 
Second, alternatives to state service delivery, in particular of water supply, are occasionally provided 
by NGOs and MSPs (through projects), and – more structurally - by actors in the private sector, but at 
much higher costs. Not surprisingly, these actors benefit from deficiencies in public sector service 
delivery; to the extent that other service providers speculate about damage to the water supply 
infrastructure. Third, the WaSH and solid waste sectors in Palestine are heavily dependent on donor 
support and international pressure on Israel to grant permits.  
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In Gaza, public-private partnerships have emerged. The Hamas authority offers licenses to actors in 
the private sector to access, withdraw and treat water from a well, for sale in the private sector. 
Interestingly, while the water supply by the private vendors in Gaza is perceived to be of better 
quality by consumers; much of it poses long-term health risks due to over-demineralisation. One of 
the key problems in both the water sector and the waste sector is the revenue collection, although this 
is gradually improving by combining water and/or waste fees to electricity bills. 
 
Utility sector context 
Elaborate descriptions have been provided in chapter 2. Problems with basic service delivery relate to 
coverage, access and quality, as well as to continuation of services after donor withdrawal. Services 
are concentrated more in urban areas than in rural areas, though these services are regularly 
interrupted due to maintenance problems, drought periods, lack of supply by Mekorot, electricity 
interruptions and – more structural – management problems in these sectors. Several of the 
governance problems are inherent to the political situation and relation with Israel, while others can 
be understood from the (historically evolved) path of developments of the various state 
organizations.  
 
In all case studies, one can observe cooperation between local, sometimes regional, and national 
stakeholders. New initiatives that improve service delivery in the water, waste water and waste sector 
generally need support, assistance or approval from PWA, MEnA (EQA), and or other authorities at 
national level. In all cases, except one, permits and approval were required from the Israeli civil and 
sometimes military authorities for site selection, construction or rehabilitation. In a number of cases, 
contacts by the funding agencies with Israeli civil and military authorities were instrumental in 
receiving the permits and clearance. Stakeholders repeatedly expressed their appreciation for donors‟ 
involvement in this process, and stated to appreciate a more active and facilitating role by the donor 
agency, provided the on-the-ground staff was experienced, able to adjust procedures to constraints in 
the security context when these emerged, and that there was continuity (not a year-by-year 
replacement). Yet, they cautioned that some donors were focused on following their own agenda too 
much without paying sufficient attention to the reality of the Palestinian context.  
 
Interestingly, those stakeholders present at the mid-term and validation meetings, emphasized that 
the engagement of the donors‟ community should extend to creating an enabling environment for 
private sector-led development; however, simultaneously taking a development approach that targets 
the structural problems of the economy - that is responsible for weakened productivity
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. Moreover, 
they expect greater synergy between the reconstruction plans, beyond their stated emphasis on 
shared development goals.  
 
7.2 Characteristics of MSPs 
Actors 
The provision of services in the WaSH sector and the solid waste sector is done by various 
organizations: Village Councils; NGOs (with support from donors), utility companies, such as the 
Jerusalem Water Undertaking (JWU), Joint Service Council(s) and the Palestinian Water Authority. 
Services are further provided by private vendors and firms when governmental organizations fail to 
                                                          
83 Although not explicitly mentioned, these structural problems is likely to refer also to the restrictions of fuel, 
water, permits, closures.    
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provide these services or are not able to provide reliable services without interruption. All MSPs 
included local authorities (village councils or joint service councils), state authorities (for example 
EQA and PWA), NGO(s) such as PHG, funding/donor agencies, while some MSPs also included 
beneficiary groups. The role of Palestinian NGOs
84
 in the MSP varied from providing training 
courses, awareness raising activities and capacity building, such as in Kharas village to taking a 
leading role in implementation, such as the project involving desalination and water quality 
monitoring campaigns in Al-Bureij.  
 
In all cases, private sector already played a role in the implementation of the project by MSPs, either 
as contractors, consultants, or companies/individuals providing services. This applies in particular 
to: provision of drinking water; emptying of cesspits; waste pickers, and fuel supply. Although these 
are not considered „members of the MSP‟, they also have a financial interest in continuation of their 
services. Those private actors that provide drinking water, empty cesspits, pick waste at unregulated 
waste dumps, and supply fuel, operate both in the formal and informal market economy. 
 
Initiation 
The initiation of the initiatives (bottom-up/top-down) seems to have no bearing on its success; the 
active support from, and effective cooperation with national authorities, however, seems to have 
facilitated the success. The two cases where national state organizations were actively involved and 
supportive of the MSP initiative were relative successful compared to those two cases where 
cooperation with state organizations was said to be deficient and challenging. This brings another 
issue to the fore: it is difficult to generalize on „state organizations‟, given the diversity (horizontal 
and vertical) of organizations, individual capacities and functioning of various branches of these 
organizations. 
 
Objectives  
The MSPs of the 4 cases all included training, awareness raising or capacity building components in 
their objectives, to ensure continuity and performance on the long term. However, in 2 cases, this 
proved not sufficient, as the infrastructure was not well maintained. These components, however, 
may be partly related to donors‟ demands on infrastructural projects.  
 
Funding 
The initiatives rely, to a great extent, on foreign funding for the construction and rehabilitation of 
infrastructure
85
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7.3 Governance of the multi-stakeholder process 
A clear division of roles, which was present more in some cases than in others, proved to contribute 
to the projects‟ success. However, when MSP members did not have the resources or the capacity to 
perform their roles well, the responsibilities were sometimes shifted to other members who were able 
                                                          
84 It has been suggested, outside the context of the case studies, that – at times – there is some tension between 
large NGOs such as PHG, and the governmental departments responsible for water, agriculture or environment 
– because both depend on foreign funding for development projects. This was, however, not confirmed or 
mentioned during any of the meetings with stakeholders from NGOs and the official departments (PWA, MEnA, 
MoA) at the PHG office. 
85 An overview of proposed, and implemented works in the water and waste water sector is – for each 
governorate - provided in the basic needs and developments report, with reference to their funding agencies 
(PWA, 2009). 
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to perform this role. The division of roles, and performance of MSP members in the MSP process, was 
subject to changes in the internal setting (replacement of staff or re-election of members) and external 
changes in the political environment.  
 
Decision-making 
On the positive side, a clear decision-making procedure based on anonymous voting and majority 
rule, as in the case of the Joint Service Council for the Zahret Al-Finjan landfill, was reported to be 
quite effective. Stakeholders stated that it resulted in a stronger feeling of inclusion and ownership by 
smaller municipalities, than if consensus would have been the basis for decision-making. Clear 
decision-making procedures strongly contributed to the effectiveness of the MSPs studied and feeling 
of inclusiveness and ownership.   
 
Communication 
The case studies where cooperation and communication within and between stakeholder 
organizations was perceived to be problematic (in particular in Kharas village and Al-Bureij), reveal 
that these problems emerged in particular with stakeholder organizations that experienced capacity 
problems in terms of their functioning, human resources, individual educational level and skills, 
financial resources, leadership qualities or internal conflict. Initiatives that identify strengths and 
weaknesses in organizations‟ capacities, and contribute to the institutional capacity of stakeholder 
organizations are therefore a logical step in the encouragement of multi-stakeholder processes. 
Cooperation and communication processes were further interrupted where staff was replaced or 
appointed based on political affiliation. This was particular manifest in Al Bureij, as described in 
previous chapter.  
 
Institutionalisation 
Institutionalization of roles and responsibilities was essential for continuation of service delivery 
upon project completion. In those cases where institutionalization of responsibilities after the project 
was well taken care of, and institutionalized through formal agreements and ensuring the future 
availability of resources, the sustainability was much higher than in those cases where it had not been 
carefully planned and implemented. The sustainability of the MSPs as such was limited, due to lack 
of financial and human resources to continue cooperation upon project completion. MSP members 
clearly indicated to regret this, since (a) monitoring of the initiatives contributes to the sustainability 
of these initiatives; and (b) cooperation provides mutual respect and learning. 
 
Trends 
Several trends are particular manifest in the water, waste water and waste sector MSPs: 
 Cost-recovery is a major issue mentioned in all meetings; revenue collection at local level is 
somewhat improving, but remains a challenge; often resulting in a decrease or collapse of 
services that were temporarily improved by the MSP 
 Monitoring of the activities upon completion of the project, by donors and national actors, is 
perceived to be crucial by all stakeholders present at the meetings. They called upon donors 
to consider a mechanism or process through which projects could be monitored in the years 
following project completion. At this moment, this seems to be outside the modalities and 
timeframe, that most donor organizations work with. 
 Involvement of beneficiaries at an early stage, through a needs-assessment, focus group 
discussions, participatory workshops and discussions within the communities, results in 
higher acceptability of the initiative. Involvement of the local population at later stages of the 
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project usually takes place in the projects‟ training or awareness raising activities (and not in 
the governance or decision-making process). 
 While most actors are strongly involved with the project during construction time, this 
involvement drops after the project is finished, leaving citizens (such as the farmers and local 
communities) dealing with these projects by themselves.  
 
7.4 Outputs  
The objectives of the first two projects (irrigation well rehabilitation; and the landfill project) were 
mostly achieved and perceived by stakeholders to be quite successful. These outputs have been 
described in detail in previous chapters. The outputs of the third and fourth project (waste water 
treatment plant; and the desalination plant) were considered less sustainable, and less effective. While 
the waste water treatment plant was successful at the start, it was not operational anymore after the 
first 7 years, due to poor maintenance and lack of financial resources for rehabilitation. Although the 
desalination plant for Al Bureij has improved water quality to some extent, the water quality is too 
low to consider it as drinking water. This results from blending the treated water with water from 2 
other wells. 
 
MSPness 
The cooperation between multiple stakeholders was a common process, but not always 
communicated externally as „MSP‟. Beneficiaries were usually not aware of the cooperation between 
these stakeholders in the improvement of service delivery. These MSPs were dynamic in their 
initiation, their composition, and their institutionalization.  
 
Achievement of objectives and performance of services 
Two observations can be made. First: achievement of objectives in improving hardware was more 
successful than the „software components‟ of the objectives, such as institutional strengthening, 
capacity building, cost recovery, and improving governance of the service delivery in general. 
Second, beneficiaries look first and foremost, at the performance of service delivery. As soon as this 
performance drops (due to maintenance or capacity problems), their appreciation decreases as well. 
MSP members, on the other hand, look more at each others‟ performance in the process of project 
planning, decision making, implementation, and cooperation.  
 
Capacity of actors 
Stakeholder organizations that experienced capacity problems in terms of their functioning, human 
resources, individual educational level and skills, financial resources, leadership qualities or internal 
conflict, hampered the functioning, effectiveness of the MSP and the sustainability of its actions. 
Initiatives that identify strengths and weaknesses in organizations‟ capacities, and contribute to the 
institutional capacity of stakeholder organizations are therefore a logical step in the encouragement of 
multi-stakeholder processes. 
 
Sustainability 
The sustainability of the MSPs achievements, in the first and second case, were related to (a) 
institutionalization and/or clear division of responsibilities for operation, maintenance and 
monitoring upon project completion; and (b) a carefully designed, generally agreed upon, and well 
implemented plan of action for revenue collection that allows for proper operation and maintenance. 
Stakeholders indicated that both donors and MSP members are responsible for such a system, and 
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that it would be much better if there would be a clear mechanism / process for monitoring the 
sustainability of such projects upon project completion.  
 
Reflection on costs and benefits 
This report has shown that benefits are realized at individual, household and community level. Not 
all benefits are reflected in the projects‟ official objectives. For example, rehabilitation of irrigation 
wells has convinced people to stay in their land and be part of building their own country besides 
earning some money abroad. Some costs and benefits cannot be measured in economic terms. Current 
assessment procedures and cost-benefit tools generally fail to take this systematically into account. 
Furthermore, cost-benefit analysis assume a homogenous perception of costs and benefits; while 
benefits for the wider community (landfill) may have specific disadvantages for individual 
households (e.g. those living near the landfill and experiencing the smell). 
 
7.5 The impact of MSPs for Service Delivery on State Legitimacy 
 
General and embedded legitimacy 
General legitimacy, based on political and ideological considerations and preferences, and embedded 
legitimacy, based on historically developed conventions, have shown such overlap for the case of 
Palestine, that we decided to discuss them as one category. This category is less directly connected to 
the MSP, but assesses the following indicators: (a) the knowledge of the existence and activities of 
relevant state institutions; (b) the willingness to participate in activities organized by them; (c) the 
willingness to pay for services provided by them; and (d) the extent to which such state institutions 
are seen as operating accountable and representative. These issues to a large extent determine the 
expectations on the basis of which the performance and process of the institutions within the MSP are 
appreciated. In the cases described in previous chapters, these indicators have been discussed in more 
detail.  
 
While (a) and (b) show that beneficiaries have some general knowledge of relevant state institutions, 
and are willing to participate in activities organized by them, it is particularly the willingness to pay 
for services (indicator c) that is repeatedly mentioned as a challenge. , The willingness to pay is 
problematic for services provided by the state in both the waste, waste water and water sector alike. 
Surprisingly, however, the willingness to pay for solid waste services in the landfill initiative has been 
higher than expected. Water is, by part of the population in some areas, seen as „God given‟, while in 
other cases it is poverty that is said to cause unwillingness to pay. While prices for similar services in 
the private sector are many times higher, these services are not provided without payment by the 
customer, and therefore people complain, but pay nonetheless – when they have no alternative. 
 
The extent to which state institutions are seen as operating accountable and representative (indicator 
d), requires more explanation. In talking about ‟the‟ legitimacy of the Palestinian state institutions we 
should first distinguish between local authorities (municipalities and village councils) and national 
level authorities (such as the MoA, PWA, and the MoH). Information from the questionnaires indicate 
that „the State‟ is often interpreted by respondents primarily in terms of national authorities, and not 
the locally (elected) officials and staff from municipalities or village councils. The governance 
dimension is, in the case of rehabilitation of wells in Qalqiliya and Tulkarem, strongly bound by the 
context of the conflict, the Israeli laws on abandoned land, the location of land in area C and the Seam 
Zone, and by the formal procedures of permits from Israel. While a „good state‟ is mostly interpreted 
in terms of performance (service delivery and basic needs), accountability and absence of corruption, 
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a „good state‟ is also whether or not authorities are successful in defending Palestinian interests vis-à-
vis Israel. The perceived long term impasse in, and lack of result from, negotiations, contributes to a 
vision of the PA being paralyzed and ineffective. At the same time, very little has been done to 
consolidate society. The culture in which citizens first, and foremost, rely on non-state actors, or on 
their own efforts, has reduced the momentum to look at the future of the Palestinian society.  
 
However, since this is closely intertwined with a general belief in negotiations as failed instrument in 
international relations with Israel, it is – from an analytical point of view – problematic to attribute 
this to a lack of legitimacy of „the State‟ as such. Furthermore, historically, there is distrust among the 
Palestinian people towards the public sector86. This has a direct impact on the state‟s general and 
embedded legitimacy, as described in chapter 1; affects the ability of state authorities to collect 
revenues, thereby negatively the potential for proper operation and maintenance.  
 
Process legitimacy 
The process of cooperation between state- and non-state actors, or between multiple stakeholders in 
the MSP, showed variation between the case studies. While cooperation was perceived to be 
exceptionally well in the well rehabilitation in Tulkarm and Qalqiliya; and in the case of the Landfill; 
it was perceived to be very challenging in the case study on the waste water treatment plant for 
Kharas village and in the water campaign and desalination plant for Al Bureij. Cooperation was least 
satisfactory between state and non-state actors, when one of the partners experienced capacity 
problems in terms of functioning, human and financial resources, leadership qualities or internal 
conflict, as in the case of El Bureij. Cooperation between state actors of different political affiliations 
(Hamas and Fatah) was seen as major bottleneck in the last case (Al Bureij). In none of the other 
projects has this played such a clear role. Since the indicators are mostly assessed by MSP members 
themselves, the process legitimacy is therefore – first and foremost – legitimacy of the process by MSP 
members, not necessarily by beneficiaries or consumers. 
 
Performance legitimacy 
Performance legitimacy is directly related to improvements in accessibility, quality, reliability, and 
affordability of the service provided. In the case of the landfill, it is also related to the effective closure 
of illegal dumps, thereby improving the environmental conditions of people living near the dumps. 
Performance legitimacy is dynamic and temporary, in that it responds directly to 
improvements/deterioration of service delivery. Performance and process legitimacy cannot always 
be seen in isolation, in particular not among MSP members themselves. This could be seen most 
clearly in the case of the Jenin Landfill: 
 
“Performance legitimacy has increased among MSP members, in particular the leaders from 
Municipalities and Village Councils; more communities want to join in, seeing the positive results of 
the JSC. The JSC is considered an example which can be replicated in other areas and other sectors 
(2nd case in this report). This suggests an increased legitimacy of JSC‟s for Solid Waste Management.  
 
International legitimacy 
The international legitimacy can be understood as (a) the recognition and legitimacy of state 
institutions among international actors as well as (b) the legitimacy of international actors, their 
interventions and their role in the MSP among MSP members. The recognition and legitimacy of PA 
state institutions (at various administrative levels) is not mentioned as an issue among international 
                                                          
86 One of the members of the advisory committee described this as “since long time, the perception of the 
Palestinian is that the public sector is the enemy” (personal communication, November 2011). 
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actors that operate in Palestine or fund activities for improvement of service delivery in Palestine. The 
lack of international recognition of a Palestinian State limits the possibilities for further development 
and adequate service delivery. This, however, does not mean that recognition of Palestine as a State 
would solve most of its problems in service delivery. In the case of Gaza, the lack of recognition of 
Hamas as legitimate authority has directly affected cooperation between multiple stakeholders; it 
affected the funding for projects in service delivery; it affected the composition of councils and elected 
bodies; it resulted in parallel governance structures and in cooperation problems between multiple 
stakeholders of different affiliations. 
 
7.6 Key factors 
The key factors in the (socio-political & institutional) context that influence MSPs and service delivery 
are embedded in the conflict situation; both the conflict with Israel and the internal power struggles. 
Related to this are the division of area A, B and C that stem from the Israel-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement (Oslo II); the constraints in the functioning of the Joint Water Committee, and thereby the 
lack of independence vis-à-vis Israel in the development of infrastructure, policies, service delivery 
and implementation of projects in the water, waste water and solid waste sector.  
 
The lack of sovereignty has led to the situation in which citizens do not rely on the State for services, 
even distrust state authorities, and are tired of practices of corruption that emerged. Citizens have 
become used to a situation in which their basic needs, such as health care, water supply and 
education were taken care of by non-state actors, or by their own efforts. This situation created the 
platform for the culture of individualism: Palestinians learned to solve their own problems without 
relying on the State. This culture also affects cost-recovery (willingness to pay) and thereby 
hampering the sustainability of services delivered by state authorities. 
 
Our study revealed that the legitimacy of Palestinian state organizations that participated in the MSPs 
to enhance service delivery is affected by (a) its institutional and professional capacity, (b) its 
responsiveness to citizens‟ needs, (c) its dependency on decisions from Israeli authorities, (d) its 
performance in service delivery, (e) its enforcement of rules and regulations, (f) the acceptability of its 
policy and instruments, and (g) the perception of the PA in general. The lack of recognition of the 
Palestinian State remains a major constraint, even though the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, 
stated in his recent speech: 
 
“While there are many challenges to this goal, let me stress an important, indeed  historic, achievement of 
the Palestinian Authority during the past year. The Palestinian  Authority is now institutionally ready to 
assume the responsibilities of statehood, if a  Palestinian state were created. This was affirmed by a wide 
range of members of the  international community at the meeting of the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee in 
September.” (UN Secretary-General's Message on the International Day of Solidarity  with the 
Palestinian People, 29 November 201187) 
 
                                                          
87 See: http://www.un.org/en/events/palestinianday/sgmessage.shtml accessed 1 December 2011 
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